Myanmar Spring Chronicle – April 04 Scenes
MoeMaKa, April 05, 2024
Military Headquarters and Airfield in Nay Pyi Taw Attacked with Drones
At around 10:00 a.m. on April 4, the military headquarters and the ALAR Airfield in Nay Pyi Taw’s Zeyarthiri Township came under attack by PDF forces aligned with the NUG, employing nearly 30 drones. The PDF forces were the first to report the attack, with the military council issuing a press statement regarding the drone attack later in the evening.
During World War II, suicide planes employed by the Japanese Air Force to destroy enemy US Navy warships were referred to as kamikaze, meaning “Divine Wind.” Today, some drones, which drop bombs and do not return, resulting in detonation, are also termed kamikaze. Particularly in the Ukraine war, there are reports of the Russian military utilizing kamikaze drones produced by Iran.
The Kloud Wing Unit and another drone unit under the Shar Htoo Waw Technological Drone Force were responsible for the attack on two critical military targets in Nay Pyi Taw. News photos depicted handmade drones, with the attacking PDF forces claiming to have used 29 drones, while the military council stated the number to be only 13. The military council released images of the drones and exploded drones shot down near the runway of ALAR Airfield but did not disclose detailed information regarding the targeted attack on the military headquarters.
Media outlets such as the BBC and Radio Free Asia (Burmese) reported the temporary closure of Nay Pyi Taw’s ALAR Airport and increased security measures. Nearby residents reported no unusual explosion sounds or fire damage. Regarding the military headquarters, the news media did not receive specific information on whether it was damaged. Regarding the targeted attack on the military headquarters, the military council stated they successfully intercepted the drones flying towards Zeyarthiri Township.
In response to the attack, the Ministry of Defence of the NUG government issued a press release. Minister U Yee Mon stated that the explosive power of the missiles contained in the drones exceeded 107mm.
Some township areas bordering Nay Pyi Taw, including those bordering the Eastern Yoma and parts of Karen State, southern Shan State, and Karenni State, where armed conflicts are ongoing, are positioned to penetrate Nay Pyi Taw and carry out unexpected attacks. However, strategic offensives and territorial occupation attacks appear currently unfeasible. The PDF forces conducted guerrilla and drone attacks, dealing a moral blow to the enemy’s military council. The ability to attack Nay Pyi Taw’s central part with drones, perceived as beyond the PDFs’ reach or threat, is a morale booster for anti-dictatorship forces.
The military council may intensify Nay Pyi Taw’s security. However, in the technology era, where drones can reach precise locations without human presence, ensuring constant protection with sophisticated and costly materials offers no absolute guarantee of prevention.
The ability to attack Nay Pyi Taw with drones is indeed encouraging. This morale-boosting stance, along with strategic attack capabilities and organized forces, is vital. Achieving territorial control in Myanmar’s ethnic regions and key areas such as Sagaing, Magway, Mandalay, Bago, Ayeyarwady, and Yangon Region, and coordinating political and military activities among armed groups, is crucial. The ultimate victory depends on meeting these conditions and requirements over time.