Myanmar Spring Chronicle – May 19 Scenes
MoeMaKa, May 20, 2024
Fierce Fighting Continues in Kachin State
The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) began its offensives in March, just weeks after the 3 Northern Brotherhood Alliance signed a ceasefire agreement in Kunming, China. Over the past 2-3 months, the KIA has captured numerous military camps and several towns, continuing its aggressive campaign. They have taken Namhpatkar in Kutkai Township, Momeik, and Mabein in northern Shan State. Additionally, the KIA has seized military council camps along the Myitkyina-Bhamo Road, a strategic hill on the road to Laiza, and the trading post of Lwegel. There are rumors of China’s reluctance regarding the capture of the Lwegel border trade post, though the reasons are unclear.
In many areas of Kachin State, the KIA has launched simultaneous offensives, primarily targeting military camps rather than cities. To gain control over the Hpakant region, known for its valuable mineral resources, the KIA has attacked and captured military camps and large villages en route to Hpakant.
Currently, there are no signs of preparations to capture major cities such as Myitkyina and Bhamo. The KIA is also providing extensive support to the People’s Defense Forces in the Sagaing Region, Upper Magway Region, Chin State, and Upper Magway Region border areas. The military council harbors a particular grudge against the KIA due to its assistance to the People’s Defense Forces.
Headquartered in Laiza near the China border, the KIA needs to maintain good relations with China to some extent. However, China may be aware of the KIA’s good relations with Western countries, raising some concerns. Unlike the KIA, the 3 Northern Brotherhood Alliance must maintain closer ties with China. Given the military council’s successive losses of territories, troop surrenders, and the capture of strategic positions by ethnic armed groups since the start of Operation 1027, the KIA understands this as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. Any ethnic armed group, including the KIA, would seize such an opportunity when the military council’s morale and material resources are depleted.
Faced with the choice of either maintaining full control or focusing on strategically important areas, the military council is compelled to prioritize the latter. It must retain control of resource-rich areas, strategic locations, and tax-collecting border stations and port cities.
This is why the military council is desperately trying to retain regions where China’s deep-water port and energy pipelines pass through, particularly in Rakhine State. Losing Rakhine State would be a significant economic and military setback, comparable to the loss of other important border trade areas like northern Shan State and Myawaddy in Karen State.
Currently, neighboring countries are engaging in talks and negotiations with both the military council and ethnic armed groups, prioritizing stability, economic, and trade interests.