The Genocide Ruling and Its Repercussions Within Myanmar Society

Myanmar. Spring Chronicle November 20

The Genocide Ruling and Its Repercussions Within Myanmar Society

MoeMaKa – November 21, 2026


Following the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling that the events in northern Rakhine State in 2017 constituted genocide, Myanmar has entered the historical record as the first country to be held responsible for committing genocide by the court.

In 2017, more than 30 police outposts in northern Rakhine State were attacked. A few days later, Myanmar’s military launched operations against the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). During the several weeks of military operations that followed, approximately 10,000 civilians lost their lives.

The ICJ’s ruling has prompted comparisons and questions about other mass atrocities throughout history. Why were those cases not brought before the ICJ? Why were similar judgments not issued in those instances? Such questions have become part of the public debate surrounding the ruling.

One frequently cited comparison is the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip, where Israeli military operations against Hamas militants have continued for nearly three years, resulting in the deaths of more than 70,000 Palestinian civilians, according to figures cited in the debate. Some have questioned whether those events will also be legally determined to constitute genocide.

Others have pointed to the mass killings in Rwanda, where approximately 500,000 people were killed during the violence between Hutu and Tutsi communities, and to Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, where around two million people died. They question why those atrocities were not prosecuted and adjudicated as genocide before a court such as the ICJ.

There may be different historical, political, and legal reasons why cases involving Rwanda, Cambodia, Serbia, and Sudan did not follow the same judicial path as Myanmar’s case. Those raising such comparisons may be seeking to emphasize that justice is not always consistently achieved in international affairs.

During the Myanmar military’s operations against ARSA in August and September 2017, armed forces comprising military personnel and security police entered Rohingya villages. In some villages, hundreds of residents were killed on allegations that they were associated with ARSA.

These atrocities occurred in an era when smartphones and digital technology had made it possible for ordinary people to document events. As a result, concealing or destroying evidence of such actions had become increasingly difficult.

During the operations, many people in Myanmar believed that the Rohingya had entered the country illegally from Bangladesh. There was also a widespread narrative that there were no Rohingya in Rakhine State, only Bengalis.

Against this background, armed forces carried out killings of civilians and acts of intimidation intended to terrorize Rohingya communities and force them to flee Myanmar.

In the digital and information technology age, the Myanmar military could no longer effectively conceal evidence of killings, sexual violence, and other abuses.

These atrocities must also be understood in the context of decades of discrimination against the Rohingya. Restrictions on freedom of movement, childbirth, and access to education had long been imposed on Rohingya communities. Many were denied opportunities to pursue higher education because they lacked the necessary identity and residency documents.

Such discriminatory policies and practices had persisted for decades.

With the ICJ now ruling that Myanmar committed genocide and ordering compensation for the harm suffered, another important question has emerged: Will the Rohingya finally obtain justice?

It would be difficult to deny that the judgment represents an initial step toward justice. However, given the current circumstances in Myanmar, particularly in Rakhine State, there is little reason for optimism that accountability, meaningful justice, or guarantees against future acts of genocide will be achieved anytime soon.

For the more than one million Rohingya refugees living in Bangladesh, the ruling may not necessarily represent a tangible victory.

A more realistic interpretation may be that the judgment constitutes a victory primarily for overseas Rohingya advocacy organizations and individuals whose international profiles and influence have grown through their involvement in the Rohingya cause.

For Rohingya refugees living in overcrowded camps in Bangladesh, where they face threats from armed groups, kidnappings, and shortages of food and medicine, the judgment does little to immediately improve their daily lives.

Likewise, Rohingya communities remaining inside Myanmar continue to face armed conflict, forced recruitment, and human rights violations.

The November 19 judgment will undoubtedly be welcomed by many Rohingya as a ray of hope. Yet no one can say when the justice they seek will actually become a reality.

The ICJ ruling has also generated political repercussions within Myanmar society.

Some supporters of the Spring Revolution have welcomed the judgment, interpreting it as a development that could place additional pressure on the government of military leader Min Aung Hlaing, who currently holds power in Myanmar.

However, even among supporters of the Spring Revolution, the Rohingya issue continues to generate confusion, disagreements, and deeply divided opinions.

Those holding liberal or progressive views have generally welcomed the ruling without reservation. Some believe that Myanmar should formally apologize to the Rohingya, recognize their right to citizenship, and acknowledge them as an ethnic nationality of Myanmar.

Others, including some supporters of the Spring Revolution and individuals directly participating in the resistance, oppose the killing of Rohingya civilians but remain strongly resistant to recognizing the Rohingya as citizens or as an ethnic nationality.

Such attitudes have become apparent in discussions on social media.

For example, one social media post questioned why the Rohingya were demanding rights when other ethnic nationalities in Myanmar had not yet achieved freedom themselves.

The person expressing that view was reportedly a member of an ethnic armed organization actively fighting against the military that seized power in the 2021 coup.

Similar contradictions can be found among some individuals who identify with left-wing political ideologies and have extensively studied Myanmar’s history. Despite their broader political beliefs, some have expressed support for certain actions taken by the military against the Rohingya.

Ultranationalist groups commonly referred to by their critics as Ma Ba Tha have generally been associated with supporters of the military and the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP).

Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that extreme nationalist attitudes are not confined to any single political camp.

They can exist across the political spectrum.

The November 19 ICJ judgment has made these divisions particularly visible.

People who previously assumed that others shared their political principles and commitments are now discovering unexpected differences in attitudes, beliefs, and ideological positions.

In some cases, individuals regarded as political allies have revealed deeply entrenched nationalist views and positions that others consider extreme.

The ruling has therefore done more than raise questions about Myanmar’s international legal responsibility for genocide. It has also exposed profound disagreements within Myanmar society, including among those who otherwise stand together in opposition to military rule.

These differences reveal how complex and unresolved the Rohingya question remains, even among political forces that share a common commitment to opposing military dictatorship.

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