Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from July 2
(MoeMaKa), July 3, 2026
Death Toll in Myanmar’s Civil War Surpasses 100,000 After More Than Five Years
The number of people killed during Myanmar’s armed conflict since the 2021 military coup has now exceeded 100,000, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), an organization that documents and researches armed conflicts worldwide.
ACLED’s announcement does not provide a breakdown of how many of the more than 100,000 fatalities were civilians and how many were combatants. The figure should generally be understood as referring to people killed directly in armed conflict, including deaths caused by weapons, fighting, torture, and executions. It does not appear to include indirect conflict-related deaths, such as people who died while displaced, from illness, malnutrition, or other humanitarian consequences resulting from the war.
The total also excludes deaths arising from the broader collapse of governance during the civil war, including increased criminal violence. Likewise, during the COVID-19 pandemic, thousands of people died in 2021 amid inadequate public health management. Other excluded casualties likely include those who died while illegally crossing into neighboring Thailand in search of work or to evade military conscription, as well as people who died prematurely because they were unable to obtain medical treatment inside Myanmar.
According to ACLED, Myanmar is now home to more than 1,200 armed groups, making it the conflict with the greatest fragmentation of armed actors in the world. The organization also assesses Myanmar’s civil war as the second-largest armed conflict globally after the Palestinian conflict.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has persisted since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, involving wars between Israel and Palestinian armed groups, as well as conflicts between Israel and neighboring countries. The conflict has remained unresolved and has periodically intensified. Since Hamas launched its attack in October 2023, more than 70,000 Palestinian civilians have reportedly been killed over the subsequent two years.
The extensive use of modern weaponry—including ground forces, heavy artillery, airstrikes, missiles, and drones—has contributed to the exceptionally high casualty figures in Palestine within a relatively short period.
By contrast, Myanmar’s civil war has largely been fought with small arms, shoulder-fired launchers, mortars, and artillery. However, in recent years, the use of air power and drones has increased significantly, raising the likelihood that the death toll will continue to climb.
In many armed conflicts, civilian deaths outnumber those of combatants. However, in Myanmar’s current civil war, there is no publicly available data indicating the ratio of civilian to military fatalities.
Across towns and villages, killings have occurred on both sides under accusations that individuals were informants, collaborators, supporters of the enemy, or participants in the opposing side’s administrative system. Both supporters of the military regime and people accused of assisting Spring Revolution armed groups or urban guerrilla networks have been targeted. One report estimated that by around 2023, approximately 6,000 people had been killed in such targeted killings by both sides.
Although Myanmar’s conflict has not involved the widespread use of highly destructive missile systems seen in Israel and Palestine, the war has spread across almost the entire country.
Now, more than five years into the civil war and entering its sixth year, neither side appears capable of achieving a decisive military victory.
From late 2023 through much of 2024, there was considerable optimism that the military might be defeated decisively. During that period, resistance forces captured substantial territory, while the military junta struggled to replenish its manpower and had not yet fully integrated drone warfare. Had the resistance been able to intensify its offensive at that stage, it might have been in a position to defeat the military.
However, circumstances subsequently changed. China shifted its level of support, while the military rapidly expanded its drone capabilities through training and procurement. At the same time, many resistance groups slowed their coordinated offensives after achieving key territorial objectives, instead focusing on administering the areas under their control and seeking political recognition.
In summary, the opportunities that existed during 2023–2024 appear unlikely to return in the same form. Although one can envision a scenario in which the Spring Revolution’s armed organizations operate under a unified command and common strategy, significant obstacles remain. These include the geopolitical interests of neighboring major powers, many of which continue to engage with the military government led by Min Aung Hlaing, limiting the prospects for such unity to translate into a decisive military outcome.