Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from June 21
(MoeMaKa), June 22, 2026
The Foundation for Peaceful Coexistence Between the People and the Revolutionary Forces
Commentators have increasingly argued that the principal challenge facing military leader-turned-president Min Aung Hlaing is not merely retaining power, but demonstrating an ability to govern the country effectively and maintain stability. In theory, an election marks the beginning of a new political system. In reality, however, Myanmar’s civil war remains unresolved.
For that reason, the central question facing Myanmar in 2026 is no longer whether President Min Aung Hlaing will remain in power. Rather, it is whether the political system he leads can resolve the country’s armed conflicts, or whether those conflicts will simply evolve into new forms and continue to persist.
Let us examine some recent developments.
Following Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to China, contacts between the military authorities and ethnic armed organizations that have either maintained ceasefires or signed various peace agreements have noticeably increased throughout the country and along the border regions. Current discussions involve NCA signatories as well as organizations such as the RCSS, NMSP, and DKBA. Observers are now watching closely to see whether these engagements will produce new agreements, concessions, or political arrangements.
Among these developments, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) is said to be increasingly focused on gaining recognition for a unified “Wa State” by linking the northern and southern Wa regions. Analysts suggest that the organization seeks a political arrangement that would formally connect the Panghsang-based northern Wa region with the southern Wa areas near the Thai border.
Meanwhile, according to Myanmar Peace Monitor, the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) seeks formal recognition of Mongla Special Region 4 as an officially recognized self-administered area. One indication of its position is its apparent opposition to military interference in territories under its control. During meetings held in 2025 and 2026, the NDAA reportedly called directly for the removal of martial law imposed on Mongla Township.
The situation of the RCSS/SSA and SSPP/SSA within Shan State differs somewhat. Some Shan political actors appear increasingly concerned that the future political map of Shan State could be redrawn by others. For them, questions regarding territorial status and the future federal structure remain issues that must ultimately be negotiated with Naypyidaw. Discussions continue around how political authority and territorial arrangements should be shared among the Shan, Ta’ang, Wa, Kokang, and other ethnic political forces.
Whether the issue concerns federalism, self-administration, or the eventual delineation of territories, there remain organizations that believe final decisions and formal recognition will ultimately require negotiation with the Myanmar military, which still controls significant military capabilities and state power.
These developments suggest that Myanmar’s politics is no longer defined solely by military strength. The country appears to be entering a phase in which questions of future political status, territorial governance, and legitimacy are being negotiated simultaneously.
For the forces that emerged from Myanmar’s Spring Revolution in 2021—and for civilians living across the expanding conflict zones—the challenge is broader. The question is not simply how to deal with the military authorities, but how revolutionary forces should define their political and military position in both the short and long term.
Because the Spring Revolution was founded upon the objective of ending military dictatorship altogether, the key question is no longer only, “How do we win?” Increasingly, it has become, “How do we establish ourselves as a political force?” More than five years into the civil war that began in 2021, the military authorities, ethnic armed organizations, and regional powers themselves have already begun positioning themselves to protect and advance their respective interests.
For the revolutionary movement, the most important question is no longer simply how to confront the military government. Questions of how to preserve federal democracy, justice, and popular representation—and how to define a political and military role in a Myanmar where the military’s administrative structures and claims to legitimacy continue to expand—have become increasingly important.
Raising such questions may invite criticism from within the revolutionary movement itself. Yet it is evident that revolutionary organizations are currently confronting disputes over territory, conflicts of interest, and the need to reassess alliance structures and coalition arrangements. At the same time, significant differences have emerged between populations living in active war zones and those in relatively stable areas. These widening gaps have made it increasingly necessary to encourage empathy, mutual support, and continued solidarity among the people.
On one side, the military authorities are attempting to expand their legitimacy through political dialogue, regional diplomacy, and state administrative mechanisms. On the other side, revolutionary forces and the broader public are struggling with war fatigue, competing interests, and growing misunderstandings among themselves.
Under such circumstances, the strength of the revolution no longer lies solely in its ability to wage armed struggle. Increasingly, it depends upon preserving trust among the people, fostering mutual respect, and sustaining a political culture capable of allowing diverse communities to coexist and move forward together.
As the military authorities expand their political initiatives, the revolutionary side must work even harder to strengthen trust and unity within its own ranks. In the end, the decisive question may no longer be who controls the most territory. Rather, it may be who can best preserve the trust of the people while helping to build Myanmar’s future.