Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from April 19
(MoeMaKa), April 20, 2026
Myanmar’s Political Landscape and the Capacity for Strategic Change
On April 17, military leader Min Aung Hlaing—who seized power in a coup and later became president through an चुनाव—announced an amnesty. He also reduced the sentence of former President U Win Myint, who had been arrested, charged, and imprisoned on corruption allegations since the 2021 coup, and released him. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, however, has not been released, and no information has been disclosed regarding her health or place of detention.
After the 2010 general election, the USDP government led by U Thein Sein took office in early 2011 and carried out political reforms, including the release of political prisoners. At that time, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was freed from house arrest just days after the election. Many had hoped that a similar scenario might re-emerge in 2026. However, current conditions suggest that such a relaxation is unlikely. Amnesty announcements have been made twice—before and after the election period.
On November 26, 2025 (National Victory Day), authorities announced the release of political prisoners detained under Section 505(a) and the dropping of charges against others. Then, after the election, on March 2 (Peasants’ Day), further amnesties were granted to prisoners held under Sections 50(j) and 52(a) of the Counter-Terrorism Law.
Although thousands of political prisoners were released in these two amnesties, key NLD leaders, some members of the 2021 government, and certain regional and state chief ministers were excluded and remain detained. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, U Win Myint (until his recent release), and several senior NLD figures and chief ministers have continued to be held.
After convening parliament in March, electing a president, and forming a new government, another amnesty was announced on April 17 (Myanmar New Year’s Day), reducing sentences under Section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code and releasing over 4,000 prisoners. U Win Myint’s release was issued separately through a distinct announcement.
Some have hoped that U Win Myint’s release could mark the beginning of efforts to resolve the country’s civil war and political divisions. However, releasing only him is far from sufficient to open a meaningful path toward resolving the political and military crises that have persisted since the February 1, 2021 coup.
Fighting continues daily across the country, along with ongoing airstrikes and extrajudicial killings. Although ceasefires have been reached with some ethnic armed groups, clashes with many others persist. Intense battles, offensives, and territorial seizures are occurring almost daily in Rakhine, Kachin, Magway, Sagaing, Mandalay, Ayeyarwady, Bago, Karen, and Tanintharyi regions, with widespread airstrikes continuing.
Given this situation, it is evident that the military-led government under Min Aung Hlaing—despite forming a new administration—has no real intention of ending the civil war, establishing a federal democratic union, or withdrawing the military from politics to return it to its proper role.
This reflects the position of the military regime. Looking at the resistance forces, their situation has also evolved. From October 2023 through mid- to late-2024, resistance forces achieved a peak period of military success. While not nationwide, they gained the upper hand in many क्षेत्रों—from northern Shan State in the east to Rakhine in the west, as well as Karen and Karenni states in the south, and Chin and Sagaing regions in the northwest.
This period can be described as the high-water mark of the resistance’s military success, when hopes were high for a decisive victory over the military regime. However, from early 2025 through early 2026, the military has managed to launch counteroffensives and regain control of several towns and territories it had previously lost, shifting in some areas from a defensive posture back to offensive operations.
Among resistance forces, issues such as organizational survival, territorial control, governance authority over captured areas, and access to natural resources have begun to strain unity. These competing interests have, at times, undermined cohesion among different resistance groups.
Rather than simply attributing these internal tensions to divide-and-rule tactics by the military, it is crucial to examine the root causes and seek real solutions. Why does the level of unity seen before October 2023 no longer exist? What factors have changed? These questions need to be addressed openly and honestly.
It is also insufficient to attribute everything solely to pressure from China. While geopolitical pressures, including those from China, are factors, such explanations are not entirely comprehensive or fully accurate.
The military regime continually reassesses and adapts its military, political, and diplomatic strategies to changing conditions. Likewise, resistance forces must review and adjust their own strategies to align with evolving realities. It is also critically important for alliances among resistance groups to function as genuine partnerships, with real unity and cohesion.