Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from April 21
(MoeMaKa), April 22, 2026
Diplomatic engagement intensifies after the military leader assumes the presidency
Although most of the public disapproves and does not accept it, Min Aung Hlaing has now realized his long-held goal of becoming an elected president—one of the original aims behind his coup. Over the past few days, that objective has been implemented. While the military and the USDP-dominated parliament were voting for presidential candidates and during the swearing-in ceremony, fighting and aerial bombardments continued across southern, western, northern, central, and upper Myanmar.
Following an election held in Naypyidaw about four months ago—widely seen as carefully managed—the victorious USDP representatives were busy, in the days leading up to Thingyan, convening the Union Parliament to appoint the president, vice presidents, ministers, deputy ministers, and other union-level bodies. Meanwhile, across the country, hundreds of thousands of civilians were fleeing conflict. Many were killed or injured, and countless homes were burned, leaving people in anguish and grief.
It is roughly estimated that Min Aung Hlaing’s military controls between 40% and 60% of the country’s territory. These areas include major cities such as Naypyidaw, Yangon, Mandalay, Pathein, Bago, Mawlamyine, Taunggyi, and Myitkyina, as well as key transport corridors like the Yangon–Mandalay highway and routes linking Yangon–Thaton–Hpa-an–Mawlamyine–Ye–Dawei. Despite losing large portions of the country’s periphery, the military still holds Myanmar’s central core, including critical infrastructure such as airports and seaports vital for trade.
Although Min Aung Hlaing has achieved his ambition of becoming president, he now governs a country deeply scarred by territorial losses, ongoing युद्ध, and immense destruction of wealth, natural resources, and human life. It is hardly a situation that inspires pride or dignity.
The number of countries attending his presidential inauguration was fewer than ten, mainly neighboring countries along with Russia and Belarus. This suggests that many governments are maintaining a degree of diplomatic distance from what is nominally called a civilian administration under Min Aung Hlaing.
After the swearing-in ceremony and the Thingyan holidays, reports emerged that the foreign ministers of Thailand and China would pay official visits to Naypyidaw. Thailand’s foreign minister is expected to visit on April 22, followed by China’s foreign minister on April 26.
The visit by Thailand’s Foreign Minister, Maris Sangiampongsa, can be interpreted as a gesture of recognition toward the newly installed president, as well as a signal that Thailand’s recently reconstituted government intends to maintain relations with Myanmar. Relations between the two countries operate on multiple levels—not only between governments but also separately between their respective militaries. Recently, intense fighting along the Thai-Myanmar border, including airstrikes by Myanmar’s military that crossed into Thai territory, has been reported.
There have also been incidents in recent weeks where artillery shells crossed the border, injuring people on the Thai side. Despite these घटनाएँ, there are no indications that they have significantly damaged military-to-military relations between the two countries.
In addition to the Thai foreign minister’s visit, China’s foreign minister is expected to visit three Mekong-region countries—Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar—in sequence. Reports indicate that after visiting Thailand and Cambodia, he will travel to Naypyidaw. This would mark his second visit to Myanmar in nearly two years, following a previous stop in August 2024 during the Mekong-Lancang meeting.
That earlier visit coincided with the peak of Operation 1027 in northeastern Myanmar and is widely believed to have marked a shift in China’s policy—applying pressure on ethnic armed groups in the region. Recent developments seem to support that interpretation.
So what is the significance of this second visit within two years? It may indicate China’s intention to recalibrate relations with Min Aung Hlaing’s newly formed government, which emerged after elections and a transition to a nominal civilian administration. China also appears eager to restart projects related to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Myanmar. Just last week, reports emerged of a meeting in Lashio between a Chinese delegation and three ethnic armed groups from northern Shan State, reportedly focusing on BRI-related matters.
Looking at global developments—such as the Iran–U.S./Israel conflicts—where control over trade routes is being used strategically, the importance of key maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca has become more evident. At the same time, alternative trade routes are gaining strategic significance.
For China, the corridor from Yunnan through northeastern and central Myanmar to the Rakhine coast and the Bay of Bengal is becoming increasingly valuable geopolitically. While oil and gas pipelines are already in place, China is likely eager to accelerate infrastructure projects such as railways along this route.
In summary, Myanmar’s geographic position is becoming more strategically important for China. This suggests that China has a strong interest in stability and an end to conflict within Myanmar. At the same time, it is likely to continue supporting the military while increasing pressure on other ethnic armed groups amid the ongoing civil war.