Myanmar Spring Chronicle – February 17 Overview
MoeMaKa, February 18, 2025
Current Status of TNLA & Military Council’s Negotiation in Kunming
Since the visit of China’s Foreign Minister to Naypyidaw in August last year, there have been notable shifts in China’s policies regarding the ongoing armed conflicts between Myanmar’s military council and various armed groups.
After the coup, China initially maintained a somewhat distant stance from the military junta. However, by August 2024, China’s Foreign Minister visited Naypyidaw, signaling a change in China’s approach. Regardless of whether China favored or disfavored the coup, it became clear that China did not want the junta to collapse. Consequently, China has adopted a strategy of both incentives and pressure—supporting ethnic armed groups while simultaneously urging them to engage in negotiations, as military operations began to threaten China’s regional interests.
The August visit marked a turning point in China-military relations. China sought to prevent further territorial losses by the military and attempted to contain the ongoing offensive operations by ethnic armed groups.
Political analysts and media outlets have speculated that Operation 1027 was heavily influenced by China. However, no concrete evidence has been provided to confirm this claim. Nevertheless, shortly after the operation began, China mediated a ceasefire negotiation between the military council and the ethnic armed groups involved in the offensive. This led to the Haigen Agreement on January 11–12, resulting in a temporary ceasefire, particularly in regions bordering China.
The first ceasefire agreement in mid-2023 had collapsed, leading to a resumption of hostilities by the Kokang (MNDAA) and Ta’ang (TNLA) armed groups. These renewed offensives resulted in the capture of key towns such as Lashio, Kyaukme, Naungcho, and Hsipaw. In response, China imposed stricter trade restrictions on Myanmar at border crossings and increased pressure on ethnic armed groups to negotiate.
Following the second wave of offensives, the MNDAA reached a ceasefire agreement with the military council last month. Subsequently, negotiations between the TNLA and the junta have now emerged as the next step.
The ongoing negotiations in Kunming, Yunnan Province, have reached their second day, and some details have surfaced on social media. While neither the military council nor the armed groups have officially disclosed information, sources close to the negotiations have shared updates.
According to leaked reports, the TNLA has proposed that the military council officially recognize 16 townships—including 14 major townships and 2 sub-townships—as part of a “Palaung State.” In exchange, the TNLA has offered to release captured military personnel without conditions. Additionally, if this demand is met, the TNLA has pledged that it will remain within the Union of Myanmar and will not seek secession.
The 14 townships reportedly include Namkham, Mantong, Namhsan, Muse, Namtu, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Mogok, Moemeik, and Mine-ngaung, among others. However, the military council has responded by stating that it does not have the authority to grant official recognition to a new state and that such matters can only be decided by a future government.
While these reports have not been officially confirmed, it is evident that the TNLA is leveraging China’s pressure to gain political recognition through negotiations.
On the military council’s side, their primary goal in negotiations is likely to push for the withdrawal of ethnic armed groups from captured towns and the reopening of border trade routes. The TNLA, under pressure from China, is compelled to participate in the talks, yet it is also seeking to use this opportunity to gain formal recognition of its controlled territories.
It is clear that the military council does not have the authority to officially recognize a new “Palaung State,” as the 2008 Constitution drafted under Than Shwe’s military regime does not allow such provisions. Additionally, the junta itself has violated the 2008 Constitution by seizing power, making any commitments from the junta legally uncertain.
Prior to this meeting, the MNDAA had reportedly requested that the towns and regions it captured under Operation 1027 be recognized as part of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone. The military council had responded by stating that it had no authority to make such a decision.
Although details of the MNDAA-junta negotiations have not been publicly disclosed, it is evident that fighting and airstrikes in MNDAA-controlled areas have ceased, and China has reopened border trade routes.
Whether the TNLA will sign an agreement similar to the MNDAA remains uncertain. The situation will become clearer in the coming days, and further developments should be closely monitored.