Myanmar Spring Chronicle – February 16 Overview
MoeMaKa, February 17, 2025
Is the Cyber Scam Syndicate Issue an Opportunity for the Military Junta to Regain Control of Myawaddy?
In recent months, there has been a continuous stream of news regarding cyber scam syndicates operating within Myanmar territory along the Thailand-Myanmar border. These developments have not only resulted in shifts on the ground but have also had political and military implications.
Before the cyber scam issue became the center of attention, the situation in Myawaddy was already undergoing changes due to the positioning of armed groups such as the Border Guard Force (BGF) and Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), as well as the military junta’s presence in the region. After months of fighting, the crackdown on cyber scam syndicates has now become one of the most critical issues in the region, significantly altering the power dynamics.
On February 15, Thai military and police officials, along with representatives from Myanmar’s military junta and other civil authorities, held a meeting in Mae Sot, Thailand, to discuss human trafficking and cyber scam-related crimes. The meeting was officially titled a bilateral discussion on assisting victims of human trafficking between Thailand and Myanmar. Representing the Myanmar side was an officer from the Light Infantry Battalion 275 (LIB-275), also known as the Myawaddy Garrison.
Back in March and April 2024, when junta military bases near Thingan Nyi Naung village were overrun one after another by joint forces led by the Karen National Union (KNU), the junta’s control over Myawaddy weakened to the point where it was only nominal. BGF troops under Saw Chit Thu took control of Myawaddy while functioning as a buffer between the KNU-led coalition and the junta forces. BGF primarily acted in its own financial interests rather than taking a clear stance in favor of the military.
After junta troops of LIB-275 were forced to abandon their base, they were later allowed to return under BGF protection within a few weeks. Since then, Myawaddy has remained under the influence of BGF, with the junta’s control limited mostly to border trade operations and immigration checkpoints along the Myawaddy-Mae Sot border bridge.
For several months, the junta had neither the authority nor the manpower to manage security within Myawaddy. Instead, its role was confined to administrative control over the border gate. Even its intelligence and police units lacked the power to make arrests or conduct security operations inside Myawaddy town.
The military junta, having lost control over most of Myawaddy aside from the border checkpoint, held its first formal meeting with Thai authorities following the rise of the cyber scam syndicate crisis. The scandal weakened BGF’s authority and raised speculation that the junta might attempt to regain control of Myawaddy.
When China began pressuring Thailand and Myanmar to crack down on cyber scam syndicates, the junta remained silent because it lacked real control over the region. The cyber scam operations were protected by BGF and DKBA armed groups, allowing the junta to avoid direct involvement.
However, as Thailand and China intensified their crackdown on cyber scam syndicates in Myawaddy, BGF and DKBA leaders seemingly realized that they had to act to ensure their own survival and maintain the existence of their armed groups.
As Thai and Chinese officials conducted operations in Mae Sot, Mae Sai, and Three Pagodas Pass to dismantle cyber scam syndicates, the junta remained silent for weeks. Despite the Myanmar military’s claim over these territories, they were not under its actual control. The junta’s silence could also be interpreted as an attempt to distance itself from BGF, which had broken away from its command in early 2023.
Recently, a Chinese deputy minister visited Naypyidaw to discuss the cyber scam crackdown, the repatriation of human trafficking victims, and border security with junta officials. Following this, additional lower-level meetings were held between Myanmar and Thai authorities in Mae Sot.
Regarding the cyber scam syndicate crisis, the biggest losers in terms of reputation and financial losses are BGF and DKBA, while KNU has also suffered reputational damage to some extent. For the Myanmar military, the crisis may present an opportunity to regain some territory and influence it had previously lost. If so, this would align with the junta’s strategy of leveraging any available situation to its advantage.