Myanmar Spring Chronicle – January 12 Overview
By MoeMaKa, January 13, 2025
Renewed Tensions Between TNLA and the Military Council Forces
Approximately five months after the second phase of Operation 1027 began in late June last year, on November 25, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) announced its readiness to cease ongoing clashes and engage in political negotiations with the military council. This announcement followed intense fighting in northern Shan State, which had also drawn considerable, albeit quiet, pressure from neighboring China. In October and November, the MNDAA and TNLA armed groups, which had scaled down their offensives to capture towns and bases, similarly issued statements expressing a willingness to engage in political dialogue.
While the military council suffered significant losses in towns and bases in northern Shan State, it publicly expressed a general willingness to engage in political or peace talks. However, it simultaneously continued aerial attacks on areas it had lost, signaling an unwillingness to concede ground. Observers suggest that China, fearing instability or the collapse of Myanmar’s military regime, is concerned about the potential negative impact on its interests, including its investments. As a result, China is believed to have decided to support Myanmar’s military council through political and diplomatic channels.
About six weeks after TNLA announced its readiness to negotiate politically, the group marked the 62nd anniversary of Ta’ang National Revolution Day on January 12, 2025. On this occasion, TNLA declared plans to intensify military operations throughout 2025 to overthrow the military dictatorship and achieve complete liberation.
There has been speculation that last year’s announcement by TNLA was made under pressure from China. However, the reasons behind the group’s recent contrasting stance remain unclear. Some suggest that TNLA might feel less impacted by the economic effects of border trade restrictions imposed by China or that its recent declarations are motivated by internal mobilization strategies. Meanwhile, the MNDAA, which faced similar Chinese pressure, has refrained from military actions or public statements in recent weeks.
Developments in Shan State
In recent weeks, clashes near Naung Cho involving TNLA and military council forces have subsided, but fighting has intensified in the Kyaukgu area of Yatsauk Township in southern Shan State, involving the Danu People’s Liberation Army (DPLA). The Kyaukgu-Naung Lam road, a vital route connecting northern and southern Shan State, has been a focus of these skirmishes.
Observers speculate that TNLA and allied groups, including locally organized PDFs, aim to consolidate control over key routes, such as those linking towns like Naung Cho, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, and Lashio.
Challenges for Ethnic Armed Organizations
Despite calls from China for TNLA and the Arakan Army (AA) to cease fighting and negotiate, these groups face difficulties complying. TNLA appears intent on capitalizing on its military momentum and the disarray within the military council, which is reportedly struggling with reorganizing and resupplying its forces. TNLA’s strategy likely aims to prevent the military from regaining strength and to seize as much territory as possible.
To sustain their momentum, ethnic armed groups like TNLA and AA will need to forge agreements with local PDFs and ethnic militias, particularly in regions such as Mandalay, Kyaukse, and southern Shan State. Similarly, the AA may need to coordinate with PDFs in Magway, Bago, and Ayeyarwady regions to ensure alignment with its broader strategy.
As TNLA looks to expand southward, cooperation with Danu PDF and other ethnic armed groups in Shan South will be essential. Any further moves toward central Myanmar will require similar partnerships with local resistance forces.
This evolving dynamic underscores the critical role of unity among diverse resistance groups in achieving their shared objectives.