Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scene on October 27
(MoeMaKa) October 28, 2024
A Year After the 1027 Operation: Transformations
It has now been a year since October 27 of last year, when three ethnic armed groups in northern Shan State, Myanmar, simultaneously launched attacks on towns and military posts controlled by the military junta.
The operation was announced with the primary objective of suppressing the online fraud syndicates (known as “Tiger Hunt” in Chinese) that had grown along the China-Myanmar border, as well as dismantling the involvement of military and militia forces supporting these fraud networks. Notably, in the weeks leading up to the operation, some Chinese intelligence agents were reported to have been killed by ethnic border guard forces in Laukkai, Kokang region, while conducting reconnaissance. China, aiming to curb these online fraud activities, apparently viewed the mission as a national responsibility, prompting the northern allied armed groups to launch the 1027 operation with a strong focus on eradicating these fraud rings.
China’s dissatisfaction with the military junta’s corruption—enabling online fraud by military, police, and administrative forces—led it to support the northern ethnic armed groups. Initially, the junta underestimated both the manpower and strategy of the three northern groups, as well as China’s stance. After years of limited success in taking major towns and bases, the junta had not anticipated that the ethnic armed groups would gain enough ground in northern Shan State to capture towns, much less challenge the junta with significant losses.
Comparing with the 2015 Kokang insurgency and the 2019 TNLA offensive along the China-Myanmar border trade routes and certain garrisons, the military did not foresee this scale of confrontation and loss. Unlike the previous campaigns, which were geographically isolated, this time the military faces a broad multi-front conflict, from Kayah and Karen states to Tanintharyi, Rakhine, Kachin, Chin, and parts of central regions like Magway and Sagaing.
Ethnic groups reportedly reviewed the lessons from 2015 and 2019, applying them to the 1027 operation. Some analysts even suggest that the groundwork for this operation was laid prior to the military takeover. In the year since the 1027 operation began, areas under ethnic armed control on Myanmar’s map have grown, with some towns falling under their control within two weeks of the October battles this year.
After the first wave of the 1027 offensive subsided in January, the groups held their positions and began establishing governance. By June and July, they resumed the second phase of the operation, now reaching parts of northern Shan and Mandalay regions and Rakhine state.
China, initially supporting the 1027 mission, is now concerned about potential national disintegration, urging a ceasefire through diplomatic, economic, and political leverage. However, it has found success in pressuring only some of the armed groups.
In summary, the 1027 operation is seen as rooted in the pursuit of self-administration, autonomy, and regional liberation. While it hasn’t completely toppled the junta, the operation represents significant gains and bolsters the momentum of the anti-junta movement.