Myanmar Spring Chronicle – August 31 Scene
(MoeMaKa), September 1, 2024
Reflecting on China-Myanmar Relations and the Issue of the Authenticity of a Letter from the Ruili Security Committee
On August 31, 2024, reports continued to emerge regarding the authenticity of a letter dated August 29, allegedly sent by the Ruili Security Committee in Yunnan Province, China, to the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). Chinese authorities claimed that the letter was not genuine. When questioned about the letter’s authenticity during a press conference in Beijing, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry refrained from confirming whether it was real or fake. Instead, they diplomatically emphasized China’s continuous efforts to engage in discussions on Myanmar’s situation, the conflict in northern Myanmar, and to promote ceasefires.
The wording of the letter was seen as authoritative and stern by groups opposing Myanmar’s military junta. The National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) released a statement on August 31, responding to the letter from the Ruili Security Committee. The statement was firm and called for the retraction of the letter, using diplomatic language.
So far, neither the TNLA, which reportedly received the warning letter, nor the National Unity Government (NUG) has officially responded to the statement. It’s unclear whether the lack of response is due to caution regarding China or uncertainty about whether the letter represents the stance of the Chinese government.
**Historical Perspective on China-Myanmar Relations and Armed Group Interactions**
Throughout Myanmar’s political history, relations between China and the military dictatorship, or Ma-Sa-La (BSPP), have often been fraught. During the Ne Win era, China supported the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) through military aid, training, weapons, and safe passage along border areas, leading to strained relations with the military junta. This support turned Myanmar’s internal political dissatisfaction into a broader China-Myanmar conflict.
It was only after Mao Zedong’s death, and China’s shift in economic and international relations policies, that relations between China and Myanmar began to transform.
**China’s Involvement with Myanmar Post-1988**
Following the 1988 uprising, China cultivated a close relationship with Myanmar’s military dictatorship, providing the regime with diplomatic cover at the UN, as well as arms and military aircraft. This contributed to growing anti-China sentiment among the public, which paralleled the growing anti-military junta movements.
China also maintained strong ties with the National League for Democracy (NLD) government after it came to power in the 2015 election. The NLD sought to build good relations with China, signing 33 agreements and hosting visits from the Chinese president.
After the military coup in 2021, China did not openly support the junta but continued to engage with it through a pragmatic, realpolitik lens to safeguard its interests. The junta initially sought closer ties with Russia, distancing itself from China, but following military setbacks during the 2023 1027 military operations, the junta found itself increasingly reliant on China.
Although it’s unclear how much direct involvement China had in these operations, it is believed that China played a key role in the 1027 military campaign, as many of the armed groups involved depend on China for supplies and logistics.
The main question now is whether China will continue to wield influence over Myanmar’s ongoing conflict, controlling the “reins of the running horse,” or whether it will step back. This is the central question many are currently asking.