Myanmar Spring Chronicle – August 26 Overview
(MoeMaKa) August 27, 2024
China’s Strategy Regarding Myanmar
In recent months, China has been noticeably more active and assertive in its approach to Myanmar. This increased engagement became particularly evident after the launch of the second phase of Operation 1027. Shortly afterward, China’s experienced Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar in mid-August before the Mekong-Lancang Conference in Thailand. During his visit, he met with Myanmar’s military leader Min Aung Hlaing and the Foreign Minister, engaging in policy discussions. Both the Myanmar military junta and China released statements following these meetings, although their contents were not entirely aligned. Some details mentioned in the junta’s statement were notably absent in China’s, raising questions and leaving room for debate.
The Myanmar military’s statement claimed that China’s Foreign Minister expressed opposition to the armed conflicts in Northern Shan State, but this sentiment was not mirrored in China’s official release. The lack of clarification from China on this point suggests that there was no intentional miscommunication, but it also indicates a careful and strategic approach by China in managing its interests in Myanmar.
China’s primary focus seems to be protecting its investments in Myanmar, including those under the military junta’s control. The junta’s post-meeting statement also highlighted China’s support for the upcoming elections orchestrated by the military regime. Wang Yi reiterated China’s three core principles concerning Myanmar during his visit to Chiang Mai, where he met with the foreign ministers of Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos. These principles include the importance of Myanmar not distancing itself from the ASEAN community and preventing external forces from interfering in Myanmar’s affairs.
The “three core principles” are viewed as the guiding framework for China’s stance on Myanmar. The third principle, which opposes foreign interference, likely refers to Western countries such as the United States and Europe, but it might also extend to neighboring countries like India and Russia, which have their own strategic interests in Myanmar.
This raises the question of whether China itself is engaging in the kind of interference it opposes, a point of concern among Myanmar’s political and military factions. During a speech in early August, the junta leader hinted at potential Chinese support for Operation 1027, suggesting China’s behind-the-scenes involvement in providing technical or military aid. This led to anti-China protests by nationalist groups and military supporters in Myanmar, although these were quickly suppressed by the junta.
Shortly after Wang Yi’s visit, China closed its border crossings with the Wa and Kokang regions and announced military exercises on the Chinese side of the border from Muse to Kokang. This move could be interpreted as an effort by China to pressure ethnic armed groups in Myanmar, but it’s too early to draw definitive conclusions, especially since there is no supporting evidence for this interpretation.
Among the external powers involved in Myanmar, China is the only country with the influence and capability to drive significant changes. China’s policies, attitudes, and support have an undeniable impact on Myanmar’s political and military landscape. For the NUG (National Unity Government), maintaining good relations with China is a complex and challenging decision. As an administration aligned with Western countries, the NUG faces the difficult task of navigating practical and realistic decisions in response to the geopolitical realities at play.