Myanmar Spring Chronicle — November 3 Perspective
(MoeMaKa), November 4, 2026
Anti-China Sentiment and Its Impact on Myanmar Politics
China’s involvement in the extraction and sale of Myanmar’s natural resources has long contributed to anti-China sentiment among various segments of Myanmar society. Both Chinese state-owned enterprises and private businesses have often been perceived as prioritizing profits while disregarding environmental destruction. China’s ability to exert influence over certain ethnic armed organizations and use that influence in Myanmar’s political and armed conflicts has also fueled resentment toward Chinese involvement.
It would therefore not be unreasonable to suggest that these practices have generated anti-China attitudes and opposition to Chinese influence among Myanmar’s political authorities, military organizations, and ordinary citizens.
More recently, the administrative and economic policies of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an ethnic Kokang armed organization, have reignited nationalist sentiment and opposition to Chinese influence.
Following Operation 1027, the MNDAA gained control of territories in northern Shan State. Its subsequent policies concerning the Chinese language, written Chinese, and the granting of land leases and natural resource rights to Chinese nationals have contributed to renewed nationalist feelings and anti-China sentiment within Myanmar.
Anti-China sentiment, anti-Muslim movements, and hostility toward the Rohingya—whom nationalist groups have referred to as “Bengalis,” particularly since 2012—have repeatedly been exploited in Myanmar politics.
Political authorities have used ethnic and religious divisions to mobilize extremist elements of society or manipulate public opinion for political advantage.
Such exploitation of ethnic identity is characteristic of fascist political practices and is also a familiar tactic employed by authoritarian governments. It represents a form of political manipulation in which nationalism and religious identity are used to advance the interests of those in power.
Before Operation 1027, during the offensive, and even following its military successes, the MNDAA did not face particularly prominent opposition among Myanmar’s general population or other ethnic communities based on its perceived connections to Chinese influence.
However, perceptions began to change after the MNDAA reached a ceasefire agreement with Myanmar’s military authorities.
Whether that ceasefire resulted from pressure exerted by the Chinese government or from the MNDAA’s own strategic calculations, it created the impression that the organization had prioritized its institutional survival over the broader struggle against military dictatorship.
From that point onward, the belief that China had used its political influence to slow down or halt Operation 1027 became increasingly widespread.
In August 2024, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Naypyidaw. Subsequent developments, including meetings involving leaders of the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and Chinese special envoy Deng Xijun, reinforced perceptions of Beijing’s intervention in Myanmar’s armed conflict.
China appeared to be employing a combination of diplomatic pressure, negotiations, inducements, and threats to influence relevant armed organizations and reduce the momentum of Operation 1027.
These developments reflected Beijing’s efforts to steer Myanmar’s military and political situation in a direction consistent with its strategic interests.
For Myanmar military leader Min Aung Hlaing, China’s role in slowing Operation 1027 created a situation in which he could hardly avoid acknowledging Beijing’s assistance.
Before these developments, however, ultranationalist groups that had supported the 2021 military coup had also organized demonstrations against the Chinese government.
There was clear evidence that the military authorities had permitted anti-China demonstrations outside the Chinese Embassy in Yangon following the coup.
After August 2024, however, Min Aung Hlaing’s administration no longer allowed such protests or other anti-China activities.
These ultranationalist movements, including organizations such as the Patriotic Monks Union, have generally been politically aligned with the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Many of their members openly supported the military takeover in its early stages.
Alongside their opposition to the Chinese government, these groups have also expressed hostility toward the Rohingya and Muslims in connection with the Rakhine State conflict.
Their use of expressions such as “illegal Bengali immigrants” reflects ethnic and religious hostility directed against these communities.
The military authorities appear to have treated such nationalist organizations as convenient political instruments.
When useful, these groups have been allowed to mobilize publicly, enabling the military to benefit from their activities without assuming direct responsibility. When their activities no longer serve military interests, the authorities have restricted or suppressed them.
Demonstrations outside foreign embassies, near the eastern entrance of Shwedagon Pagoda, at Maha Bandula Park, or in front of Yangon City Hall could ordinarily be dispersed within minutes if the military and police did not permit them.
The fact that certain demonstrations were allowed to proceed strongly suggests that the military authorities were exercising selective control over these movements.
In the current political environment, the MNDAA has become a central focus of anti-China and nationalist mobilization.
The MNDAA is one of the three members of the Three Brotherhood Alliance and has maintained close relationships with several other revolutionary armed organizations.
Although its relations with the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), another Brotherhood Alliance member, deteriorated following clashes earlier this year and the MNDAA’s takeover of Kutkai, it has continued to maintain constructive relations with other armed organizations within the seven-member Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC).
The MNDAA has also previously cooperated with certain revolutionary armed groups operating in Myanmar’s central Dry Zone.
In northern Shan State, particularly in towns and villages with predominantly Shan populations, the MNDAA’s military and administrative authorities have introduced changes to public signage.
These changes have included replacing existing signs with Chinese-language signs or bilingual signs in Burmese and Chinese.
The Shan State Joint Action Committee (SSJAC) subsequently issued a statement objecting to these measures. The MNDAA responded with a strongly worded statement rejecting the committee’s criticism.
Meanwhile, disputes concerning Chinese influence have also emerged on social media.
In recent days, a domestic news outlet known for its nationalist perspectives and a Chinese woman who teaches Burmese at Beijing Foreign Studies University have engaged in exchanges of written arguments.
Alongside these exchanges, allegations have circulated on social media claiming that officers and personnel from China’s People’s Liberation Army participated in the MNDAA’s Operation 1027.
These allegations remain claims circulating online rather than independently established facts.
Against this background, the United States government’s strategy concerning Myanmar has attracted renewed attention.
A strategy document published through the U.S. Embassy’s Myanmar-related communications includes references to rare earth minerals and language concerning efforts to limit or counter Chinese influence.
Although the extent to which Washington intends to become directly involved in Myanmar remains uncertain, speculation has emerged over whether Myanmar is becoming another arena of strategic competition between the United States and China.
Questions are increasingly being raised about how Beijing might respond if Washington expands its involvement in Myanmar.
There is also speculation about whether Myanmar’s military leaders could become political pawns in a broader contest between the two major powers, with their decisions and positions shaped by competing external interests.
These possibilities have become subjects of discussion and commentary in Myanmar’s political circles and on social media.
Ultimately, the central concern is the recurring exploitation of ethnic and religious nationalism for political purposes.
History has repeatedly demonstrated how extremist attitudes, ethnic hostility, and religious divisions can be mobilized whenever political actors see an opportunity to advance their interests.
The important lesson is that society must remain alert to the danger of such manipulation, regardless of which political forces seek to exploit it.
The purpose of this discussion is to emphasize the need for vigilance against the use of ethnic and religious extremism as instruments of political advantage.