Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from September 12
(MoeMaKa), September 13, 2026
Prospects for a Nationwide Offensive by Myanmar’s Revolutionary Armed Forces
In a discussion aired on Public Voice TV, a YouTube channel that serves as one of the NUG government’s communications platforms, NUG Defense Minister U Yee Mon and U Min Ko Naing, who holds a role in the NUCC, discussed the resistance against military dictatorship. During the conversation, U Yee Mon said he believed that if the military’s offensives could be broken across roughly 15 battlefronts, it could bring about a major shift in the overall balance of military power.
However, the discussion did not specify where those 15 fronts are located.
Looking at the areas where the military and revolutionary armed forces are currently fighting, the main battlefields include Rakhine State; areas bordering Rakhine in Ayeyarwady, Bago and Magway regions and southern Chin State; Shwegu and Bhamo; Myawaddy Township in Karen State; and parts of Sagaing Region.
The offensive around Ponnagyun and Sittwe in Rakhine State, together with operations along the border between Ayeyarwady Region and southern Rakhine State, began on September 4, a little over a week ago. Pro-military propaganda channels on Telegram have referred to this as the “4926 Operation.”
Another area experiencing fighting, although not necessarily on the scale of a full-fledged battlefront, is around villages near the borders of Tada-U, Kyaukse and Natogyi townships. These clashes followed a PDF drone attack last Thursday on aircraft inside hangars at the Tada-U Air Base. The military subsequently launched operations against nearby villages where it believed resistance fighters were taking shelter, leading to further clashes.
From late 2024 through 2025 and into mid-2026, revolutionary armed forces in most parts of the country have generally been operating from a defensive rather than offensive posture, with some notable exceptions. These include Rakhine State and adjacent areas, Bhamo and Shwegu in Kachin State, Katha, Myawaddy District in Karen State, and eastern Bago Region.
At present, there do not appear to be major active offensive fronts in Karenni State, northern Shan State or southern Shan State. Similarly, there is no significant ongoing fighting in northern and central Chin State or in areas such as the Kale plain along the Chin–Sagaing border.
In Mandalay Region, recent fighting has been concentrated around Myingyan, Natogyi and Tada-U, while northern Mandalay Region has remained relatively quiet. Along the eastern Karen State–Thailand border and in Tanintharyi Region, fighting has occurred in areas including the Dawei deep-sea port project zone, Maw Taung near the Thai border, and parts of Tanintharyi Township.
An examination of the current battlefields suggests that the forces involved include the Arakan Army (AA); PDFs in Mandalay and Sagaing under the NUG Ministry of Defense (MoD); PDFs operating outside the MoD structure; and combined forces involving the KIA, ABSDF, KPDFs and other allied groups.
There is no need to dispute U Yee Mon’s argument that breaking the enemy’s offensives across 15 fronts could fundamentally alter the military balance. In practical terms, however, there are indications that achieving such an outcome may be difficult.
The revolutionary armed forces fighting across these various fronts belong to different organizations. While they share some common objectives and aspirations, they also differ in other respects.
This became evident following the military successes of Operation 1027, which began almost simultaneously across northern Shan State and several other areas. As resistance forces gained territorial control, friction and conflicts of interest emerged among some of the revolutionary armed organizations. Such tensions have been visible over the past several years.
There may be broad agreement on the need to fight the military that seized power and oppose military dictatorship. However, differences remain among revolutionary armed organizations over territorial control, administration and the demarcation of areas of authority.
Examples include disputes concerning Rakhine State and the Paletwa area of southern Chin State; tensions between the KIA and TNLA over territorial control in places such as Kutkai and Namphatka; and disputes between the TNLA and MNDAA over administration that have reportedly escalated at times into armed clashes.
It is already widely understood that if disputes over territorial control cannot be resolved through political means, they carry the risk of developing into armed confrontations between revolutionary forces themselves.
For this reason, it is important for the revolutionary armed organizations to establish a basic framework, procedures and mechanisms through which such disputes can be addressed and resolved.
On the other side, the military does not face the same degree of organizational fragmentation. Its armed forces operate under a unified chain of command. As an authoritarian institution, the military does not tolerate internal disagreement and functions according to centralized orders.
Although the military may suffer from weaknesses in morale and confidence, it nevertheless retains an advantage in its ability to organize and execute operations through a single command structure.
These respective strengths and weaknesses need to be carefully weighed against one another. The revolutionary forces have reached a point where they need to formulate their military strategy with these realities firmly in mind.