Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from July 5
(MoeMaKa), July 6, 2026
The Shifting Frontlines Across Myanmar
Looking at the areas where fighting is currently taking place between Myanmar’s military junta and resistance forces, several major fronts stand out.
In Ayeyarwady Region, clashes continue in areas such as Yekyi and Laymyethna, which border southern Rakhine State and are connected to the Gwa–Nga Thaing Chaung highway.
Another active front is the Bago Region section of the highway linking Taungup in southern Rakhine State with Pandaung.
Meanwhile, on the Ann–Minbu road connecting Ann Township in northeastern Rakhine State with Magway Region, prolonged fighting has continued for years over the military’s Nat Yekan air defense radar base.
Besides these three border areas adjacent to Rakhine State, the Arakan Army (AA) is also engaged in fighting around Sittwe and Kyaukphyu inside Rakhine State itself.
Of Rakhine State’s fourteen townships, only Kyaukphyu, Manaung, and Sittwe remain under junta control. The AA had already captured all of the remaining townships during its 2024 offensives.
Along the Rakhine border in Magway, Ayeyarwady, and Bago Regions, the AA is fighting alongside local People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and other resistance organizations.
Unlike some other ethnic armed organizations, however, the AA has not formally conducted joint operations under the National Unity Government’s Ministry of Defense. Rather, it continues to pursue its own military strategy and independent political objectives.
The AA also maintains a significant force presence in northern Shan State. It participated in Operation 1027, launched in late 2023 under the banner of the Three Brotherhood Alliance. Although the alliance’s two other members later reached ceasefire agreements with the junta, the Three Brotherhood Alliance itself can still be regarded as remaining in existence.
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Chin State
North of Rakhine lies Chin State, where some of the fiercest fighting is now occurring.
Current battles are concentrated in southern Chin townships including Mindat, Matupi, and Kanpetlet, which serve as gateways into northern Rakhine State.
The junta appears to be pursuing a strategy of launching operations into northern Rakhine—including Mrauk-U and Kyauktaw—from southern Chin State.
Over the past three to four months, the military captured Kankyi Village, an important road junction connecting Yaw, Saw, and the Mindat–Pakokku highway. This suggests preparations for further offensives toward Rakhine through the Mindat and Matupi routes.
In Falam and Hakha, the military recently deployed substantial airpower and ground forces to retake Falam town and the nearby Subon airfield.
Following that, junta forces also recaptured Tunzan in northern Chin State.
More recently, they have concentrated offensives along the Kalay–Tamu highway in Sagaing Region, which serves as a major India–Myanmar border trade route.
After junta leader Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to India, military operations along the Tamu corridor appear aimed at facilitating implementation of the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway project.
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Divisions Among Chin Resistance Forces
Within Chin State, two major armed political camps currently exist.
One is the Chin Brotherhood (CB), comprising the Mindat CDF and several southern Chin resistance groups.
The other is the Chin Council (CC), led by the CNF/CNA, which previously signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA).
These two armed blocs generally do not conduct joint military operations and have occasionally experienced localized tensions and clashes on the ground.
For its part, the junta has not yet launched an all-out campaign to rapidly recapture the Chin towns it has lost. Nor has it committed major forces to attack the India–Mizoram border towns currently controlled by Chin resistance organizations.
The Chin Council maintains good relations with the National Unity Government (NUG), and the CNF/CNA has recently joined the newly established SCEF, an organization promoting the creation of a federal union.
Although military operations in Chin State have not been coordinated under a unified command like Operation 1027, resistance forces were nevertheless able to seize numerous towns during that period while the junta was overstretched on multiple fronts.
Because southern Chin serves as the main gateway into northern Rakhine, the junta is likely to continue viewing it as strategically vital, meaning fighting there could intensify further.
Likewise, northern Chin—adjacent to sections of the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway—may also see escalating conflict.
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Kachin State
Another major front lies farther north in Kachin State and the adjoining upper Sagaing Region.
Recently, heavy fighting took place around Indaw on the Myitkyina–Shwebo highway.
In recent days, the military announced that it had regained control of the entire Indaw area.
Joint forces aligned with the National Unity Government had captured Indaw in 2025, but after holding it for more than a year, they lost it following a junta counteroffensive.
Nearby areas including Bhamo and Shwegu remain contested between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the junta.
The battle for Bhamo, which has lasted more than a year and a half, remains undecided, with neither side achieving a decisive victory.
Likewise, the military has regained control of Katha, where fighting occurred earlier this year.
Although signs emerged early last month that resistance forces might launch an offensive against Shwegu, located along the Ayeyarwady River near Katha, no major battle for the town has yet materialized.
Within Kachin State itself, there has been little major fighting in the former Kachin Special Region north of Myitkyina or in western Kachin.
Instead, current combat is concentrated along the Kachin–Sagaing border, where the military is attempting to recapture previously lost towns and territory.
KIA Deputy Commander-in-Chief Major General Gun Maw has described the “Three K’s” region—Kawlin, Katha, and Kanbalu—as the gateway into Kachin State.
The junta likewise appears to regard these areas as strategically important and has launched major offensives there.
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The Northeastern Corridor
Between 2023 and 2025, revolutionary armed groups launched simultaneous offensives across northern Mandalay Region, northern Shan State, and Sagaing Region, capturing extensive territory.
However, after ceasefire agreements were signed in some areas, much of this territory was gradually relinquished.
As a result, the military has regained considerable strength across the connected corridor linking northern Shan, Sagaing, and Mandalay.
The loss of this northeastern-central corridor has also effectively severed the overland connection between revolutionary forces operating in eastern Myanmar and those fighting in the west.
(To be continued.)