Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from July 9
(MoeMaKa), July 10, 2026
Flooding Hits Four Townships in Rakhine as Myanmar Junta Continues to Ignore ASEAN
Severe flooding has affected four townships in Rakhine State—Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U, Minbya, and Ponnagyun—all currently under the control of the Arakan Army (AA). With heavy rain expected to continue, the risk of further flooding is increasing.
More than a month into the monsoon season, persistent rainfall fueled by weather systems over the Bay of Bengal has caused rivers to overflow across northern Rakhine. Weather forecasts indicate that heavy rain could continue for another week, raising concerns that the situation may worsen. Meteorologists have warned that water levels could reach their highest point in nearly two decades.
The flooding comes on top of years of conflict. Fighting first broke out in northern Rakhine in 2018 and 2019 before a temporary pause ahead of the 2020 election. After the 2021 military coup, large-scale fighting resumed in late 2023 and continued throughout 2024, leaving many communities already displaced and vulnerable before this latest natural disaster.
The flooded areas are administered by the United League of Arakan (ULA/AA). While local reports say the ULA/AA has begun emergency relief efforts, humanitarian conditions remain extremely difficult. Since fighting intensified in November 2023, the military government has maintained strict restrictions on the movement of goods into AA-controlled territory. As a result, food, fuel, and basic supplies are officially sold only in junta-held cities such as Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, primarily for government personnel.
Residents across much of Rakhine now rely on expensive smuggled food and fuel, while communities near the Indian and Bangladeshi borders depend heavily on unofficial cross-border imports of food, fuel, and medicines.
For people living under these blockades, the floods add another layer of hardship to the ongoing effects of war and economic isolation. Damaged communications have also made it difficult for communities to contact one another during emergencies.
The situation recalls Cyclone Mocha in May 2023, which devastated Rakhine, causing deaths and widespread destruction to homes, schools, government buildings, and religious sites. At that time, much of Rakhine remained under junta control, allowing some official relief operations after the cyclone. Today, responsibility for disaster response in most affected areas rests largely with the ULA/AA.
Rakhine now faces one of Myanmar’s most severe humanitarian crises. In addition to ongoing conflict, it remains subject to prolonged trade restrictions, resulting in some of the country’s highest living costs and lowest income opportunities.
Most ethnic Rakhine residents continue to support the ULA/AA, largely out of nationalist sentiment, and have endured years of economic hardship under the blockade. Although the military has attempted to weaken the AA by restricting trade and supplies, it continues to suffer military setbacks while frequently carrying out airstrikes against towns and villages across Rakhine.
In theory, natural disasters could provide an opportunity for both sides to suspend military operations and focus on humanitarian relief. In reality, however, such a ceasefire appears highly unlikely under current conditions.
Another major development today is a meeting in Bangkok between the Myanmar junta’s foreign minister and the foreign ministers of several ASEAN member states.
Following the 2021 coup, ASEAN adopted its Five-Point Consensus as the framework for addressing Myanmar’s political crisis. Until meaningful progress is made on those commitments, ASEAN has limited Myanmar’s participation in its high-level meetings, allowing only a non-political representative—typically a senior foreign ministry official—to attend instead of the foreign minister or military leaders.
There have been occasions when individual ASEAN countries, rather than ASEAN as a whole, have held bilateral meetings with Myanmar officials in Naypyidaw. Since Min Aung Hlaing formed a new civilian-style government earlier this year, some ASEAN members have shown greater interest in expanding engagement with the junta.
Thailand, which has generally taken a more accommodating approach toward Myanmar’s military government, has advocated allowing junta leaders to return to ASEAN meetings. However, several other member states remain opposed, meaning the new government has still not received an invitation to participate at the ministerial level.
At a recent ASEAN summit in the Philippines, both Min Aung Hlaing and Myanmar’s foreign ministry publicly criticized remarks made by the Philippine president regarding the military government.
Meanwhile, during a recent parliamentary session in Naypyidaw, lawmakers from the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) introduced a motion rejecting ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus, with support from fellow party members. Many observers view the move as a coordinated effort by the government to signal domestic opposition to ASEAN’s policy while continuing its diplomatic campaign to regain full participation in ASEAN meetings.
Myanmar’s political crisis and civil war have dominated ASEAN discussions for more than five years. Despite repeated efforts by the regional bloc to persuade the military government to implement the Five-Point Consensus, little meaningful progress has been achieved. The limited results after more than five years have become one of ASEAN’s most significant lessons in dealing with the Myanmar crisis.