Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from July 11
(MoeMaKa), July 12, 2026
Flooding and Rising River Levels Threaten Rakhine, Bago, Kayin, and Mon States
More than a month into Myanmar’s 2026 monsoon season, persistent heavy rainfall has caused widespread flooding across several parts of the country. The disaster comes at an especially difficult time, as ongoing armed conflict has already displaced large numbers of civilians. Many people are unable to move freely, have lost their livelihoods, and face severe financial hardship. The combination of war and natural disaster has left many communities in an increasingly desperate situation.
In Rakhine State, heavy rain has continued almost uninterrupted since July 5. Local media have reported widespread flooding that has submerged homes, schools, and religious buildings. There have also been reports of fatalities caused by fast-moving floodwaters.
Weather experts estimate that floodwaters in northern Rakhine may not begin to recede until around July 23 or 24. As of July 11, more than 100,000 people had reportedly been affected, although the full extent of the damage has yet to be assessed.
The United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), which currently administers most of Rakhine State, is responsible for organizing emergency relief efforts and providing food, medicine, and other essential supplies to flood victims. The hardest-hit townships—including Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U, Ponnagyun, and Minbya—are all under ULA/AA control.
Meanwhile, Myanmar’s military government continues to hold only Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, and Manaung in Rakhine. Restrictions on transporting goods into ULA/AA-controlled areas have forced many supplies to enter through border trade with Bangladesh and India’s Mizoram State.
The military authorities have made no public statements regarding relief efforts in the flooded areas of Rakhine. Since the affected regions are under ULA/AA administration, the military appears to consider disaster response the responsibility of the local authorities. Pro-military Telegram channels have also mocked the situation, telling residents to seek assistance from ULA/AA instead.
This contrasts with the aftermath of Cyclone Mocha in May 2023, when the military controlled much of Rakhine State and took responsibility for disaster relief operations. Now that ULA/AA controls roughly 90 percent of the state, it is expected to lead flood response efforts.
The flooding has struck before communities have recovered from years of conflict. Many homes, businesses, healthcare services, schools, and public infrastructure damaged during the war have yet to be rebuilt. With broad public support in Rakhine, ULA/AA now faces the challenge of coordinating relief efforts alongside local communities.
Flood risks are not limited to Rakhine. According to Myanmar’s Department of Meteorology and Hydrology, four major rivers—the Sittaung, Thanlwin (Salween), Shwegyin, and Bilin—have reached or exceeded danger levels, while the Chindwin River at Homalin is approaching the warning threshold.
The Thanlwin River has risen above the danger mark in Hpa-An, the Bilin River has reached its warning level in Bilin, and the Shwegyin River is flowing above the danger mark in Shwegyin.
Flooding during July and August is common in Myanmar, as these are typically the wettest months of the monsoon season. However, 2026 is expected to be influenced by El Niño-related climate patterns, increasing the likelihood of more extreme weather conditions.
For Myanmar, which has endured more than five years of civil war, these climate-related disasters are compounding an already severe humanitarian crisis. Much of the country’s financial resources continue to be devoted to military operations, leaving limited funding available for emergency relief and disaster response.
Millions of internally displaced people are now facing not only conflict but also flooding, leaving many with little access to assistance or safe shelter.
Some observers have hoped that the humanitarian emergency might encourage all armed actors to temporarily suspend military operations and cooperate in assisting civilians. However, there has been little indication of such cooperation. Ground fighting and airstrikes have continued despite the worsening flood situation, with military operations remaining the primary focus of all sides.
The current crisis highlights how natural disasters have not reduced the intensity of Myanmar’s armed conflict but have instead added another layer of suffering for civilians already caught in years of war.