Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from July 13
(MoeMaKa), July 14, 2026
ASEAN Envoys and Thailand’s Foreign Minister Hold Separate Meetings with Myanmar’s Rival Parties
The ASEAN chair, the Philippines, and neighboring Thailand have both reiterated that Myanmar’s crisis must ultimately be resolved by the country’s own stakeholders. Philippine Foreign Minister and current ASEAN Chair Enrique Manalo, along with Thailand’s Foreign Minister, stressed that lasting peace cannot be imposed from outside.
While this position is broadly accepted by all major actors—including the military junta, the National Unity Government (NUG), ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), and other political groups—the reality on the ground is far more complicated. Myanmar’s key political and military actors remain deeply divided, with many unable or unwilling to communicate directly.
For example, there has been virtually no direct dialogue between the military junta and the NUG since the 2021 coup. The junta continues to label the NUG as a terrorist organization, while the NUG considers the military an illegitimate regime that seized power by arresting the country’s elected leaders. The NUG has repeatedly stated that meaningful negotiations can only begin if the military first agrees to withdraw from politics.
The military has publicly expressed willingness to hold peace talks with ethnic armed organizations, arguing that they do not seek control of the country’s central government. However, observers note that there has been little indication of genuine political compromise in those peace initiatives.
Before the 2021 coup, Myanmar’s armed conflicts were largely addressed through political dialogue, particularly during the 2011–2020 peace process. The military takeover, however, severely undermined confidence that negotiations alone could resolve the country’s conflicts.
On July 13, ASEAN foreign ministers continued their diplomatic efforts in Pattaya, Thailand. ASEAN representatives met separately with officials from the junta’s National Solidarity and Peace Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) and with several ethnic armed organizations.
The participating EAOs were mainly groups based along the Thai border, including the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the Karen National Union (KNU), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), and the Chin National Front (CNF).
Notably absent were several of Myanmar’s most influential armed organizations based near the Chinese border, including the Arakan Army (AA), Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA). These organizations generally operate under stronger Chinese influence, making them less involved in ASEAN-led diplomatic initiatives.
Following the meetings, Philippine Foreign Minister Enrique Manalo described the discussions as “a good beginning” during an interview with Philippine media. He emphasized that it was the first time ASEAN’s special envoy had been able to meet senior representatives from several ethnic armed organizations.
However, the organizations represented in Pattaya accounted for only a portion of Myanmar’s more than a dozen EAOs. With the exception of the CNF, the participating groups are all active along the Thai border, making their attendance more practical given Thailand’s role in facilitating the talks.
Meanwhile, powerful armed groups operating in northeastern Myanmar and Rakhine State remained outside the process. Those regions continue to be shaped largely by China’s influence. In 2025, Beijing played a key role in brokering separate ceasefire arrangements between the junta and both the TNLA and the MNDAA. Even the powerful United Wa State Army (UWSA), which enjoys extensive self-rule in northeastern Myanmar, is generally regarded as operating within China’s sphere of influence.
Taken together, these developments suggest that ASEAN’s current diplomatic efforts, even if successful, are likely to have the greatest impact in southeastern Myanmar and parts of Chin State. The country’s other major conflict zones—including central Myanmar, the Dry Zone, the northeast, the north, and Rakhine—remain influenced by different military dynamics and external actors, particularly China. As a result, any comprehensive solution to Myanmar’s conflict will likely require engagement beyond ASEAN’s current initiatives.