Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from June 13
(MoeMaKa), June 14, 2026
The Nationwide Civil War and the Journey of Ceasefire/Peace Negotiations
As many had anticipated, following the election held late last year and early this year—widely described by critics as a sham election—the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), largely composed of retired military generals, emerged victorious. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, was subsequently elected president. Within the first 100 days of the new civilian-clothed government’s term, ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) were invited to participate in peace talks.
However, even as Min Aung Hlaing—who is widely believed to continue exercising effective control over the military despite formally retiring as commander-in-chief—was making this call for dialogue, military offensives and clashes were simultaneously occurring across the country.
Fighting and military operations have been reported in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu in Rakhine State; along the borders between Rakhine and Magway Regions, and between Rakhine and Ayeyarwady Regions; in Bhamo and Hpakant in Kachin State; in Indaw, where Sagaing Region meets Kachin State; near the Thai border in Karen State; in Launglon, Palaw, and other parts of Tanintharyi Region, including areas along the Thai border; in eastern Bago Region along the Sittaung River; and in parts of Chin State.
Although Myanmar is home to hundreds of armed groups, they can generally be categorized into several dozen ethnic armed organizations, PDF forces operating under the National Unity Government (NUG), and locally organized PDF units formed at the township and village levels.
The current 100-day invitation for talks is directed only at ethnic armed organizations. The NUG and other PDF forces, meanwhile, have not been invited to peace negotiations but rather have been called upon to surrender their weapons.
Although described as “peace talks,” the immediate focus appears to be on achieving a ceasefire. Genuine peace remains a distant prospect. Ethnic armed organizations can broadly be divided into three categories: those currently observing ceasefires after intense territorial offensives in recent years, those that have maintained ceasefires since before the military coup, and those currently engaged in active combat.
Groups such as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) belong to the first category. After fierce fighting during Operation 1027, they entered ceasefire arrangements that remain fragile. These agreements appear to reflect either an inability to sustain current military operations or a strategic effort to preserve control of captured towns and territories. Even if their gains have not been formally recognized, the ceasefires may serve as a means to prevent the military from reclaiming those areas while allowing the groups to rebuild strength for the future.
The second category consists of organizations that either signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) before the coup or have maintained de facto ceasefires for decades without significant conflict, continuing to administer their territories. Examples include the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA–Mongla), the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA), the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), and the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army–Peace Council (KNU/KNLA-PC). There are also smaller ethnic armed groups with limited troop strength and territory. Some have at times cooperated militarily with the Myanmar military in specific operations.
The third category comprises groups currently engaged in intense fighting, including the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Arakan Army (AA), and the Chin National Front (CNF).
The invitation extended by Min Aung Hlaing’s post-election civilianized government cannot realistically be compared with the peace initiative launched under President Thein Sein in 2011. The political and military context of that period differed dramatically from today. At present, trust between ethnic armed organizations and the military is arguably at its lowest point.
Not only combatants but also civilians have been killed, while homes, villages, and towns have been devastated by military offensives and airstrikes. Under such circumstances, calls for ceasefires and peace negotiations are difficult for many stakeholders to accept.
This raises the question of why two of the three members of the Northern Alliance agreed to ceasefires with the military. While the organizations involved have not publicly explained their decisions in detail, factors may include geopolitical pressure, declining expectations of a complete military victory by resistance forces, and calculations aimed at preserving territories already under their control.
Their leaders may have anticipated criticism and condemnation for entering ceasefire agreements with the military. Nevertheless, they may have concluded that they had little alternative but to pursue this course.
Myanmar’s peace process from 2011 to early 2021 ultimately failed and suffered a dramatic reversal—falling far short of even maintaining the gains that had been achieved. In the aftermath, peace negotiations, mediators, and those involved in peacebuilding efforts have often been denounced by armed resistance supporters as “peace brokers,” a term frequently used in a negative sense.
Looking ahead, ceasefire negotiations and peace discussions are likely to remain politically unpopular subjects for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the public will probably continue bearing the heavy consequences of ongoing warfare. Such is the assessment one might draw from the current situation.