Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from June 18
(MoeMaKa), June 19, 2026
The Myanmar Military Leader’s Visit to China and Its Implications
Myanmar military leader Min Aung Hlaing appears to be pursuing international and regional recognition by leveraging restrictive election laws and state power. After transferring the commander-in-chief position to a trusted subordinate, he assumed the presidency through an election process that enabled the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), led by former military officers, to dominate. By presenting his administration as an elected civilian government, he has sought recognition from the international community as well as major neighboring powers such as India and China.
Within less than a month of completing a five-day official visit to India, Min Aung Hlaing embarked on another five-day official visit to China. During his trip to India, discussions reportedly focused on border security issues, the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway Project. He also invited Indian business leaders to invest in Myanmar. Because the visit effectively treated him as a recognized head of state following his assumption of the presidency, it represented a diplomatic gain for the military leader.
Shortly after the India visit, China extended an official invitation to Min Aung Hlaing, a move that further enhanced his diplomatic standing. The fact that he traveled to China before even a month had passed was seen as another significant diplomatic achievement.
Although Min Aung Hlaing had met Chinese President Xi Jinping during the five years following the military coup, those encounters occurred on the sidelines of international events, such as commemorations marking the 80th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in World War II or other multilateral gatherings. In contrast, this visit was different: he was invited specifically as Myanmar’s president and welcomed with the formal protocols reserved for a head of state, including ceremonial receptions, official lunches, and meetings at the Great Hall. These were privileges he had not enjoyed while serving solely in a military capacity.
China’s policy shift toward Myanmar became increasingly evident beginning with Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Naypyidaw in August 2024. At that time, Beijing appeared to conclude that the military remained the only institution capable of maintaining control over a country with longstanding internal conflicts and an ongoing civil war.
After the 2021 coup, China had generally aligned with the United States and some European countries in allowing Myanmar’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun—who rejected the junta and supported the National Unity Government (NUG)—to retain his position. However, after August 2024, China’s support for the military government became much more explicit. Beijing also reportedly encouraged and pressured the junta to hold elections.
Approximately one and a half years after August 2024, elections were held, and before two years had elapsed, China publicly welcomed Min Aung Hlaing as president, the outcome that Beijing had reportedly hoped to see through the electoral process.
According to reports, China’s primary concerns during the visit included:
- Protection of Chinese investments in Myanmar.
- Security for the China-Myanmar oil and natural gas pipelines.
- Safeguarding the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port project.
- Advancing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in Myanmar.
- Security guarantees for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor.
- Reopening border trade routes.
- Suppression of online scam operations based in Myanmar.
Many observers question whether the Myanmar military leadership is actually capable of guaranteeing security for these projects, given the current conflict situation throughout the country.
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that Min Aung Hlaing and the military are eager to secure Chinese assistance in order to provide such guarantees. The military is likely to seek weapons, ammunition, technology, and material support from China to regain territory and conduct offensives against resistance forces.
During Operation 1027, ethnic armed organizations reportedly gained advantages with the use of drones sourced from or linked to China. However, after the second phase of Operation 1027, China allegedly provided the Myanmar military with drone-related technology, equipment, government-to-government drone sales, and electronic countermeasure systems, making it increasingly difficult for resistance forces to compete.
Many analysts also believe China pressured two of the Three Brotherhood Alliance members into agreeing to ceasefires. In doing so, Beijing demonstrated to ethnic armed organizations based along the Chinese border that they could not afford to ignore China’s influence.
For China, stability in Myanmar is fundamentally a matter of national interest. Whether Myanmar is governed democratically or otherwise appears secondary to Beijing’s desire for stability. China seems reluctant to rely on groups such as the NUG, which are perceived as having closer ties to the United States and Western countries. At the same time, Beijing also appears unwilling to place its confidence in ethnic armed organizations whose primary goals involve autonomy and self-determination within their own territories.
These considerations likely form the basis of China’s decision to support Myanmar’s military-led government. By openly welcoming Min Aung Lhaing’s administration after the election and the installation of a civilian-style government, China has signaled diplomatic support for his government. Looking ahead, this may translate into increased pressure on ethnic armed organizations operating along the Chinese border, as well as expanded military and economic support for the Min Aung Hlaing administration.