Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from June 27
(MoeMaKa), June 28, 2026
Looking back on more than five years of the Spring Revolution:
Broadly speaking, the term “Spring Revolution” refers to the entire movement that emerged after the military coup of February 1, 2021, to resist and fight against military dictatorship. The movement has brought together a wide range of actors with differing political views, military strategies, and long-term objectives.
Some organizations entered the movement with political ambitions or territorial aspirations. Others joined solely to oppose military dictatorship in defense of the rights of their social class or community, without any intention of pursuing political power or territorial control.
This distinction is not meant to portray organizations with political or territorial objectives in a negative light. Rather, it is intended to highlight that these groups naturally have interests and strategic goals of their own. When they reach a crossroads or face competing priorities, it is understandable that they may choose to place their own interests first.
At the outset of the Spring Revolution, the common denominator uniting all participants was opposition to the military coup and the military regime. Beyond that shared foundation, however, participants pursued a wide variety of objectives: ethnic self-determination, restoring the rights lost by the elected political party, advancing human rights, women’s rights, students’ rights, workers’ rights, and protecting the rights of marginalized minority communities.
Because ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), the newly formed People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), democracy activists, human rights advocates, and minority rights activists all shared the fundamental goal of resisting military rule, the Spring Revolution gained tremendous momentum. Looking back today, that shared interest can be identified as one of the key reasons for its strength.
Even before the 2021 coup, numerous ethnic armed organizations already existed. Although not every EAO joined the movement, well over half became involved. At the same time, new ethnic armed groups and Bamar-based resistance forces emerged. Their decision to treat the military junta as a common enemy placed the junta in a position where it found itself surrounded by hostile forces.
Before the launch of Operation 1027 on October 27, 2023, resistance forces were still developing their combat experience and had not yet fully secured sufficient weapons and ammunition. Nevertheless, there was little disagreement over the objective of fighting the military dictatorship, and serious conflicts of interest among resistance forces had yet to emerge.
It would not be an exaggeration to describe 2023 and 2024 as the period when the Spring Revolution reached its greatest momentum. During those years, there were no major conflicts among ethnic armed organizations, revolutionary armed groups, activists, human rights defenders, minority rights advocates, or among the resistance forces themselves. Their interests remained largely aligned.
However, by late 2024 and early 2025, tensions began to surface over the direction of Operation 1027, the distribution of its military gains, and questions surrounding territorial control. At the same time, pressure from neighboring China also became an increasingly important factor.
Before the Spring Revolution could achieve its ultimate objective, some ethnic armed organizations accepted ceasefire agreements with the junta, influenced both by Chinese pressure and by the fact that they had already achieved some of their own strategic goals.
Throughout 2025, conflicts of interest and friction among ethnic armed organizations became more visible. At the same time, the objective of completely defeating the military dictatorship appeared to lose some of its earlier clarity and momentum.
Similar divisions also emerged among organizations generally referred to as PDFs. Differences developed between the PDFs under the National Unity Government’s Ministry of Defense, the Pa Htone Lone (“Three Pa”) groups, various Local People’s Defense Forces (LPDFs), and organizations such as the PLA, which draws leadership from student activists and has historical roots linked to the Communist Party of Burma tradition.
By late 2025 and continuing into 2026, disputes over governance, taxation, management of natural resources, and recruitment of new fighters became increasingly common, leading to growing friction and conflict among these organizations.
These disputes largely stem from unresolved conflicts of interest between armed groups. Because satisfactory solutions have not been found, disagreements have escalated into open tensions and confrontations.
The political sphere has experienced similar fragmentation. Within the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), the National Unity Government (NUG), activist organizations, human rights groups, and student unions, differences of opinion have become increasingly apparent. Since early 2025, some members have left existing organizations to establish new ones, reflecting growing political divisions.
Unlike armed groups, whose disputes often center on territory, taxation, or recruitment, these political organizations are divided by differences in political philosophy, values, and approaches to addressing problems. As these differences deepen, continued cooperation has become increasingly difficult.
At the beginning of the Spring Revolution, all these actors shared the same basic foundation. After more than five years, why has it become so difficult for them to continue working together on that same basis?
Rather than debating whether the Spring Revolution is close to achieving victory or still far from its goals, one reality seems clear: without continued cooperation, the movement cannot hope to achieve its ultimate objective.