Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from June 26
(MoeMaKa), June 27, 2026
Incidents That Could Damage the Image of the Spring Revolution
News emerged on June 26 that Pu Lei Maung, commander of Battalion No. 6 under the Yinmabin District, which falls under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) of the National Unity Government (NUG), had been shot and killed at close range during a meeting by Nga Phyo, the personal assistant (PA) to the Yinmabin District Coordinating Commander.
Within hours after the news broke, a short video surfaced showing the alleged shooter, Nga Phyo, being questioned. It remains unclear who conducted and recorded the interview. In the approximately one-and-a-half-minute video, Nga Phyo is still wearing his military uniform and combat gear.
In the video, Nga Phyo claims that his superior, Bo Swam Thu Maung, the Yinmabin District Coordinating Commander, had been offered 500 million kyats (50 million? actually 5,000 lakh kyats = 500 million kyats) to assassinate him. He also alleges that he had been questioned about the locations of various battalions and accuses Bo Swam Thu Maung of passing information to the military junta.
Since the video appears to have been recorded and released within hours of the shooting, it can reasonably be inferred that it was produced immediately after the incident. It does not appear to be an interview conducted by a news organization, nor does the interviewer challenge or question the suspect critically. Instead, it appears intended more as a means of disseminating a particular narrative.
As of now, there have been no public comments from Bo Swam Thu Maung, one of the principal figures connected to the assassination.
On the evening of June 26, the General Headquarters of the NUG Ministry of Defense issued an official statement confirming that Comrade Nga Phyo had shot Comrade Pu Lei Maung, commander of Battalion No. 6, with a pistol, causing his death at the scene. The statement further announced that Nga Phyo had been disarmed, detained in the Yinmabin Military Command detention facility, and that the General Headquarters would handle the case with special attention in accordance with military law and established procedures.
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Previous Incidents in Yinmabin
This is not the first controversial incident in Yinmabin District, Sagaing Region.
Nearly five years have passed since late 2021, when Bo Than Mani, who led a People’s Defense Force (PDF) unit, allegedly killed other resistance fighters and civilians. Despite the passage of time, no significant accountability has been achieved regarding that incident.
Earlier this year, following an attack on the BNRA (Burma National Revolutionary Army) led by Bo Naga in Pale Township, Bo Naga later surrendered to the military junta. According to official announcements and media reports, hundreds of BNRA members were detained for some time by NUG-affiliated battalions before eventually being released.
Following Bo Naga’s surrender, a Buddhist monk believed to have been Bo Naga’s spiritual mentor was also arrested by NUG-affiliated forces in Yinmabin District, and the monk’s vehicle was confiscated.
According to media reports, the recently killed Battalion No. 6 commander, Pu Lei Maung, had himself been accused of selling that confiscated vehicle for approximately 20 million kyats.
Now, yet another incident involving members of PDF units killing one another has occurred in the same Yinmabin-Pale area.
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Growing Tensions Among Resistance Forces
Another recent development involves Myingyan District, where conflict has reportedly emerged between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Myingyan District Command along with the Pa Thone Lone units operating under the NUG.
The incident has raised concerns that territorial control and administrative authority are becoming points of contention between the PLA and NUG/MOD forces—groups generally regarded as allies. There are also growing fears that these disputes could escalate into armed clashes between resistance organizations themselves.
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Impact on Public Confidence
At a time when the Spring Revolution appears to have shifted into a largely defensive military posture, and when segments of the public have begun questioning the prospects for ultimate victory, conflicts among NUG-affiliated forces and other revolutionary armed organizations—as well as incidents of fighters killing one another—are discouraging many citizens who have placed great hopes in the Spring Revolution.
During 2025, as resistance forces were compelled to withdraw from territories they had previously controlled in certain parts of the country, some members of the public began wondering whether victory had become increasingly distant, leading to growing pessimism.
In the early stages of the Spring Revolution, many people actively participated with optimism, encouraged by promises from resistance leaders and the belief that victory could come in the near future—perhaps within months or by the end of the year.
However, after more than five years of revolution, the situation has changed. The military junta has regained momentum and launched renewed offensives, while differing interests among allied resistance organizations have increasingly strained their relationships. As these developments have become more visible, public morale has gradually declined.
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A Need to Restore Unity
To restore the diminishing momentum and public confidence in the revolution, it has become increasingly important for all organizations and individuals to place the collective interest above personal or factional interests.
Equally urgent is the need to avoid factionalism, internal divisions, and failures to cooperate, so that the revolutionary movement can regain its unity, strength, and public support.