Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from June 23
(MoeMaKa), June 24, 2026
Conflict Among Revolutionary Armed Groups While the Military Junta Continues Offensive Operations
As the military junta launched offensives to regain control of the transportation route linking Tamu, on the Indian border, with Kalay and Monywa, and successfully recaptured Khampat town, a separate conflict unfolded in Taungtha Township, Myingyan District, in Myanmar’s central Dry Zone. There, People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) under the National Unity Government’s (NUG) Ministry of Defense raided a base belonging to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), a revolutionary armed organization.
According to the NUG side, the raid was carried out because the PLA had allegedly arrested a civilian in Taungtha Township on suspicion of being a military informant, detained and beaten him, and demanded 200 million kyats from his family. These accusations were outlined in an official statement. The PLA, however, responded by releasing a video containing the detainee’s confession and audio recordings of telephone conversations between a PLA member and a commander from Myingyan District.
As tensions escalated between the PLA and NUG-affiliated forces operating in Taungtha Township, the NUG issued another statement accusing the PLA of unlawfully detaining an innocent civilian. During the assault on the PLA camp, four members of the People’s Defense Force were reportedly killed after triggering landmines.
Recent developments suggest that relations among revolutionary armed groups have moved beyond mere friction and are increasingly heading toward open hostility and armed confrontation.
While these conflicts among revolutionary forces are occurring, the military junta continues conducting airstrikes and ground offensives across the Dry Zone and neighboring Chin State, while also attempting to secure control over the Kalay–Tamu road corridor in Sagaing Region.
At a time when coup leader Min Aung Hlaing is attempting to transform himself into a civilian-style elected president and seeking diplomatic recognition and bilateral security cooperation from neighboring countries, the intensifying conflicts among PDFs and other revolutionary armed groups risk weakening both the military campaign and political unity aimed at overthrowing military dictatorship.
One unresolved question concerns how the NUG’s Ministry of Defense and its PDF forces intend to cooperate with revolutionary armed organizations that are not part of the NUG’s “Pa-thone-lone” (the three-pillar system of defense, security, and administration), particularly in mixed-ethnicity regions such as Sagaing, Mandalay, Magway, Bago, and Tanintharyi. On the ground, however, it appears that some NUG-affiliated forces are pressuring neighboring revolutionary groups either to come under NUG authority or leave contested areas, even resorting to military force.
Creating a unified command structure for all revolutionary armed organizations may sound appealing in theory, but in practice it is an extraordinarily difficult task. Questions remain regarding its feasibility, implementation, and timeline. Before achieving such a unified military command, it may be more realistic to first strengthen alliance-building among revolutionary forces.
In previous operations against the junta, numerous examples demonstrated successful cooperation among ethnic armed organizations and PDFs. During Operation 1027, three ethnic armed organizations were supported by many other armed groups that contributed manpower and assistance. PDFs from Karenni, the Dry Zone, Magway, Sagaing, and Mandalay also participated in combat operations in northern Shan State.
While cooperation was relatively smooth during the period when the military junta still controlled large territories, new challenges emerged after revolutionary forces captured and began administering those areas. As control shifted, disputes over territory, natural resources, taxation, and recruitment of new fighters began to surface among neighboring revolutionary organizations.
As a result, cooperation among former allies has weakened, friction has increased, and in some cases armed clashes have occurred. Examples include tensions and clashes between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), as well as between the TNLA and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) during 2025 and 2026.
While those are disputes among ethnic armed organizations, central Myanmar has witnessed growing conflicts between NUG-affiliated administrative, security, and defense bodies and other revolutionary armed groups over territorial administration and taxation rights.
Although these disputes are often framed in political and military language—such as whether organizations should come under one of the two Codes of Conduct (CoC)—their underlying substance appears to be questions of governance and tax collection.
It can be inferred that the NUG envisions areas outside ethnic minority regions—including the Dry Zone, other regions, Naypyidaw, and Yangon—as territories to be administered by its own “three-pillar” institutions. The NUG appears to recognize that ethnic regions may pursue self-administration or even confederation-style arrangements under ethnic armed and political organizations within a future federal system, while regarding the remaining regions as areas under NUG authority. These differing expectations and understandings are among the root causes of the current tensions.
However, to use a Burmese proverb, this situation resembles “not even knowing where the oil for frying the snack will come from.” At a time when no one can say with certainty whether revolutionary victory will come this year, next year, or many years from now, incidents that undermine unity among revolutionary forces risk pushing that victory even further away. It is therefore crucial to approach these developments with great caution and awareness.