Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from June 22
(MoeMaKa), June 23, 2026
After BNRA, Is PLA Next? Or Is This About the NUG, the CoCs, and Ownership of the Revolution?
One of the most talked-about recent developments is the conflict between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) under the National Unity Government (NUG).
The issue first came to light when the PLA announced that battalions under the NUG were preparing to attack one of its bases in Taungtha Township, Myingyan District. Within hours and days, an incident occurred in which members of several Myingyan District PDF units reportedly entered the area and triggered landmines, resulting in the deaths of four fighters.
Another point of contention concerns a detainee being held by the PLA. NUG-affiliated forces reportedly demanded the detainee’s release, while the PLA claimed the individual had been arrested for providing intelligence to the military junta. This has become another subject of mutual accusations between the two sides.
Regarding the alleged attempt by NUG-affiliated forces to seize the PLA base in Taungtha Township, many observers are asking why armed groups generally regarded as allies have been unable to resolve their disputes through dialogue. There is growing concern that armed clashes among revolutionary forces themselves could blur the long-held distinction between “friend” and “enemy” in the conflict and ultimately undermine the prospects for a successful revolution.
A few months ago, a similar concern arose when forces led by the NUG launched operations against the Burma National Revolutionary Army (BNRA) under Bo Nagar. Public anxiety was widespread at the time. However, large-scale bloodshed between revolutionary groups was largely avoided because Bo Nagar surrendered to the military junta shortly afterward.
It remains unclear whether Bo Nagar’s surrender resulted from pressure exerted by NUG-affiliated forces or from preexisting contacts with the military regime.
The PLA, however, is not an organization likely to surrender to the junta in the same way the BNRA did. It is an armed organization that emerged after the 2021 military coup and traces its historical roots to the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), which launched armed resistance shortly after Myanmar’s independence. Many of its leaders are former student activists who were involved in organizations such as the All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU).
In other words, the PLA is an armed group that claims the historical legacy of the communist movement and the People’s Liberation Army tradition. Its forces operate in parts of central Myanmar, including Sagaing Region, Mandalay Region, and some areas of northern Shan State bordering Mandalay.
The question “After BNRA, is PLA next?” is not meant to equate the BNRA and PLA directly, but rather to compare the two situations as potentially similar patterns.
A broader question is emerging: Are disputes arising between the NUG and non-ethnic revolutionary armed groups over issues such as territorial control, taxation rights, recruitment authority, and governance in overlapping areas? And if so, could there be more cases similar to the BNRA and PLA in the future?
Throughout the Spring Revolution, questions have also been raised about how the NUG intends to deal with the numerous armed groups that emerged across different regions. During the early stages of the revolution, village-based and township-based armed groups appeared under many different names. This led to debates over how these groups could be brought under the Code of Conduct (CoC) and later under a unified Chain of Command (CoC) structure.
The challenge is significant. Many revolutionary armed groups were formed around individual villages, townships, or charismatic leaders. They raised their own funds, purchased their own weapons and supplies, and built their own organizational structures. After five years of war, bringing all of these groups under a single military command system is proving difficult.
Many of these organizations received little or no financial assistance, political guidance, military training, or weapons support from the NUG when they were first established. Consequently, they may be reluctant to accept demands today that they withdraw from certain territories, cease operating independently, or submit to NUG command structures.
In areas where these groups have established their own taxation systems and local administration, giving up taxation rights or relinquishing territorial control would be extremely difficult in practice.
Issues such as weapons, ammunition, funding, taxation authority, and recruitment rights are concrete realities on the ground. When political ideology alone cannot unify different organizations, these practical concerns inevitably become matters of institutional interest and organizational survival for independent armed groups.
The dispute between the PLA and the NUG may involve not only competing interests but also differences in political ideology. More broadly, the challenge of persuading regional armed organizations in Sagaing, Magway, Mandalay, Tanintharyi, and elsewhere to join the NUG structure or accept the two CoCs appears far from straightforward. Recent developments increasingly suggest that integrating these diverse revolutionary forces into a single command system may be one of the most difficult tasks facing the Spring Revolution.