Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from May 1
(MoeMaKa), May 2, 2026
The underlying causes of clashes and arrests among revolutionary forces
On April 24, a news report emerged stating that in the Moebye area of Karenni State, a vehicle carrying the leader and members of the Moebye Local People’s Defense Force (Local PDF) was ambushed by the Moebye People’s Defense Force (No. 1 Alpha Military Region). As a result, around nine people, including the Local PDF leader, were reportedly killed.
However, this incident has not been widely covered by many media outlets. TM Media reported it the day after it occurred, and only several days later did another outlet publish a report citing a statement from No. (1) Alpha Military Region, saying the issue involving the Moebye Local PDF would be resolved through a military tribunal. In that second report, the घटना was not described as an ambush, but rather as an operation to disarm the Moebye Local PDF. There was no mention of an ambush on the vehicle carrying the group’s leader, Sayar Aung Min.
At present, the exact truth of what happened remains unclear. Nevertheless, similar incidents have occurred—and continue to occur—in other parts of Myanmar. For example, clashes between Bo Nagar and NUG-aligned PDF units in Pale and Yinmabin townships, and the recent case in Yemaiknyi village, Htilin Township (Gangaw District), where Captain Kaung Kaung—who had split off under the name of a regional military office—and another individual were arrested and killed by the Yaw Defense Force (YDF).
In addition, although somewhat different in nature, there have been instances of friction and armed clashes among revolutionary armed groups fighting against the military regime. These occur both between ethnic armed organizations and between local defense forces and NUG-affiliated PDF units.
If we set aside conflicts among ethnic armed organizations and examine incidents in other regions, reviewing the period from the February 1, 2021 coup to the present may help identify underlying causes that have led revolutionary forces to engage in armed confrontation with one another.
In the months following the 2021 coup, the belief emerged that peaceful protests and above-ground political activities in cities would not be sufficient, and that armed resistance was necessary to oppose the military regime. This shift was also influenced by Myanmar’s historical precedent of armed revolutionary movements.
As a result, numerous local defense forces were formed independently across different regions. Community leaders and religious figures often took the lead in organizing these armed groups, resulting in the emergence of many revolutionary forces under various names.
The Moebye Local PDF, for instance, was led by a Catholic religious leader, Sayar Aung Min. Similarly, in Upper Myanmar, there were comparable cases—such as in Yinmabin in late 2021, where a Buddhist monk became the leader of an armed group known as Bo Than Mani.
These conditions form a common underlying pattern across regions such as Upper Myanmar, southern Shan State-Karenni border areas, Yaw region, Gangaw, and Magway. As the revolution has continued over the years, this has created a situation where consolidating and integrating these groups has become an inevitable challenge.
The key question is how to organize and unify them politically and militarily. The emergence of separate armed groups after the coup can be likened—by analogy—to a “franchise model” in business, where multiple entities operate under loosely connected structures.
While the franchise model can be successful in business, in armed struggle it can lead to various problems: lack of a unified command structure, weak military cohesion, and the absence of mechanisms to regulate abuses of power or financial misconduct. This does not mean that all local groups engage in such abuses, but even among those nominally under NUG/MOD, limited central control can allow such issues to arise at the ground level.
Plans to bring these various armed groups under a single command and a unified banner should have been implemented well before now. In the process of consolidation, better political and organizational methods should be prioritized over armed confrontation.
Incidents such as the Bo Nagar case, the siege of oil fields managed by Bo Let Yar under the Magway regional authority, and the ambush of the Moebye Local PDF leader highlight the risks of failing to pursue non-violent coordination strategies.
If such approaches are not taken, continued infighting and blockades among revolutionary forces could undermine unity among those supporting the revolution—something that requires serious attention.