The Military and Political Situation After Five Years of Armed Revolution

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Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from May 4

(MoeMaKa), May 5, 2026

The Military and Political Situation After Five Years of Armed Revolution

Recent reports say that the Acting President of the National Unity Government (NUG), Duwa Lashi La, has urged members of the People’s Defence Forces (PDF) not to lose sight of their ultimate goal, despite facing growing political challenges and frequent military setbacks.

Similarly, NUG Defence Minister U Yee Mon, in a message, acknowledged that although some towns captured by the PDFs have had to be temporarily abandoned and difficulties remain, fighters are being encouraged to continue the struggle without losing morale until final victory is achieved.

Ahead of May 5, marking the fifth anniversary of the PDF forces, a short video was also released on NUG social media showing Prime Minister Mahn Winn Khaing Thann, the Interior Minister, and other officials walking through a town in Bago Region.

As the Spring Revolution reaches its fifth year, there have also been recent reports that some towns and territories controlled by NUG-aligned PDF forces, certain ethnic armed organizations, and some local PDF units have been lost. Military updates indicate withdrawals by resistance forces in areas such as the eastern bank of the Ayeyarwady River in Mandalay Region, Katha and Indaw in Sagaing Region, Falam in Chin State, and Kyankyi village along a key route linking southern Chin State and central Myanmar in Gangaw District.

At the same time, there are also battlefronts where the military junta has been unable to advance. For example, the battle for Bhamo has lasted around a year and a half, while intense fighting continues in Hpakant, at Nat Yae Kan strategic hill in Magway Region, in Laymyethna connected to southern Rakhine, and at some defensive positions along the Karen State border.

Looking at these situations, it is clear that the military junta is not in a position to launch simultaneous offensives against all resistance forces. On the other hand, its strategy appears to focus on regaining control over territories and towns lost over the past two years, as well as securing east–west and north–south transportation routes. It is also evident that the junta aims to cut off revenue sources and supply lines of the resistance forces.

The loss of areas such as Mattara, Thabeikkyin, Singu, and Tagaung—previously controlled by MDY-PDF—has disrupted east–west movement for resistance forces. It has also enabled the junta to reassert control over the Ayeyarwady River waterway from Mandalay to Bhamo. In August 2025, when the military transported supplies, troops, and ammunition via the river, their vessels faced heavy resistance along the route and struggled to move upstream.

These events may have reinforced the junta’s understanding of the importance of controlling north–south supply waterways.

Central Myanmar—including Sagaing, Mandalay, and Magway Regions—serves as a critical corridor connecting ethnic border regions and is also vital for the junta’s logistical routes. It is therefore highly likely that the military considers this area strategically crucial.

Only by firmly controlling these regions can the junta effectively isolate and blockade ethnic areas along the borders—something they likely understand well.

Based on this assessment, the ongoing offensives and operations in central Myanmar can be seen as a deliberate strategic push.

For resistance forces, it is important not only to retain control over territories they have captured locally, but also to coordinate with other resistance groups to counter and disrupt the junta’s efforts to sever key routes.

For resistance forces in Rakhine, Chin, and Kachin, it is essential that resistance forces in central Myanmar remain strong. Only if central forces can sustain effective operations will the junta be prevented from launching isolated offensives against ethnic armed groups one by one.

In summary, it is important for the NUG government to recognize the interconnected nature of its own military strategy and that of ethnic armed organizations.

In warfare, advances and retreats are natural. However, the key point is that only by understanding the enemy’s strategy can resistance forces effectively disrupt and prevent that strategy from succeeding.

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