Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from May 6
(MoeMaKa), May 5, 2026
Junta regains control of Mandalay–Myitkyina road up to the Kachin State border
A military column of the junta that advanced from Katha captured Mawlu—located north of Indaw near the Sagaing–Kachin border—on May 5, just days after seizing Indaw.
Following months of fighting between junta forces and NUG-aligned PDF units in Katha, the military recently regained full control of the town and then proceeded to capture Indaw and Mawlu in succession.
After taking Mawlu, the junta announced that it had secured the Mandalay–Myitkyina road corridor—from Mandalay through Madaya, Thabeikkyin, Tagaung, Htigyaing, Indaw, and Mawlu up to Myitkyina—after more than a year of offensive operations.
There is also another route along the western bank of the Ayeyarwady River from Shwebo connecting toward Indaw. The route now under discussion runs northward along the eastern bank from Mandalay–Madaya.
The junta’s announcement of regaining control over these roads appears primarily aimed at winning support from residents in these المناطق and from people in Kachin State who rely on this route.
Residents in Kachin State have long depended on this road—via Sagaing Region—to access food, consumer goods, medicine, and fuel. Supplies for the jade-mining region of Hpakant, in particular, are transported along this route.
In recent years, due to fighting along the Sagaing–Kachin border, the Mandalay–Myitkyina road was not entirely closed but became difficult to travel. Armed groups blocked easier routes, forcing travelers to take detours through villages and rough dirt roads. This led to delays, higher fuel consumption, vehicle damage, and multiple checkpoint fees—causing frustration among the public.
Some reports have even highlighted how such detour routes in PDF-controlled areas have reduced public support for the revolution.
While junta forces also operate checkpoints and collect taxes in areas they control, taxation and checkpoint fees in some revolutionary-controlled areas have reportedly become even more burdensome.
For people living in upper Sagaing and Kachin State, ensuring access to basic goods at reasonable prices is an issue that revolutionary forces need to take into account.
Although raising funds for the war effort against the military regime is important, concentrating that burden on goods transportation through heavy taxation increasingly places strain on civilians. As the conflict continues, livelihoods have been disrupted, savings depleted, and many have had to spend their resources on displacement and survival—reducing their ability to bear additional costs.
The junta appears to understand this situation well and is using it for propaganda, promoting its operations in PDF-controlled towns and roadways as efforts to reopen transportation routes.
Control of roads should primarily aim to cut off enemy troop and supply movements—not to restrict civilian goods and impose excessive taxation.
Additionally, when deciding to launch offensives to capture towns, it is important to consider not only the feasibility of taking them but also the ability to hold them in the long term. The battle for Katha, for example, has reportedly disappointed some local residents who support the revolution, and has even led to speculation that the offensive may have been intended as a diversion for other fronts.
Without the same momentum seen during Operation 1027, decisions to launch urban offensives now require greater caution and careful assessment.