Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from April 15
(MoeMaKa), April 16, 2026
The Palaung State Liberation Front / Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA) has welcomed the government formed by the military leader who assumed the presidency.
On April 15, the PSLF/TNLA — which signed a ceasefire agreement with the military junta on October 28 last year — publicly released a statement titled “Message of Congratulations Welcoming the New Myanmar Government Formed Under the Leadership of U Min Aung Hlaing.”
Following the October 28, 2025 ceasefire agreement between the TNLA and the junta, one of the key terms included the return of Mogok and Momeik towns to the military authorities. In accordance with the agreement, TNLA handed over both Mogok and Momeik at the end of November 2025. Prior to the transfer, TNLA also instructed People’s Defense Force (PDF) units, which had fought alongside TNLA in the battle to capture Mogok, to withdraw from the town. TNLA additionally provided security to prevent clashes between incoming junta forces and PDF units during the handover.
About three months after these events, the MNDAA (Kokang armed group) launched an offensive and seized Kutkai, which had been under TNLA control, bringing it under MNDAA administration. Along the Muse–Lashio road, MNDAA also moved to remove checkpoints operated by other ethnic armed groups.
Even before the TNLA–junta ceasefire, the military had already retaken three towns — Naungcho, Kyaukme, and Hsipaw — which TNLA and allied forces had previously captured. During and after Operation 1027, as some captured towns were lost and the junta intensified airstrikes on towns and villages, TNLA agreed to the China-mediated ceasefire. Many observers concluded that pressure from China and the impact of airstrikes were key factors behind the decision.
Although TNLA did not cooperate with the junta-led election processes held at the end of 2025 and early 2026, it has now sent a message welcoming the outcome — namely, the convening of parliament and the formation of a government led by a president.
This announcement has surprised revolutionary armed groups and their supporters who continue to oppose the military. On April 10, the junta leader formally stepped down from military duties, assumed the role of a civilian president, and appointed government officials. On the same day, the United Wa State Party/Army issued a congratulatory statement. Among ethnic armed organizations, the Wa group and the Mongla group had already expressed support; TNLA has now become the third to do so, while other groups have yet to issue similar statements.
In the third paragraph of its statement, PSLF/TNLA expressed that it would continue to uphold ceasefire commitments with the Myanmar military and the new government led by President Min Aung Hlaing, and that it “strongly hopes to resolve political issues peacefully through political means.”
This wording suggests that TNLA intends to maintain the ceasefire with the military. Within roughly a year, the situation has shifted dramatically — from the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s Operation 1027, during which large areas of northern Shan State were captured and even cities near Pyin Oo Lwin and Mandalay were threatened, to a position of ceasefire and hopes for political dialogue. This shift indicates a weakening of unity among revolutionary armed forces.
While it may not be accurate to label ceasefire signatories or those welcoming Min Aung Hlaing’s presidency as traitors or oath-breakers, questions are emerging about whether the shared national goal of collectively defeating the military has been abandoned in favor of individual group survival strategies.
There are also growing doubts about whether the armed resistance has reverted to a pre-2021 coup landscape, and whether the once-declared objective of capturing Naypyidaw and overthrowing military dictatorship is still achievable.
Various explanations are being considered for the apparent decline in revolutionary momentum: changes in the military’s strategy and adaptability, China’s intervention, or the inability of resistance groups to unite under a single vision and shared interests.
Some observers are also comparing the current situation to the post-1989 period, when ceasefire agreements without disarmament led to the formation of special regions and the co-optation of armed groups. At that time, strategies led by intelligence chief Khin Nyunt achieved partial success in persuading ethnic armed groups to cease fighting, allowing the military regime to concentrate offensives on those that refused.
Although the situation in 2026 is not identical to the early 1990s, it may bear similarities. After the intense resource expenditure of Operation 1027, armed groups may now prioritize political approaches — including ceasefires — as a way to preserve their current positions and avoid losing ground.