Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from March 14
(MoeMaKa), March 13, 2026
Who benefits from the fighting between two members of the Northern Brotherhood Alliance?
On February 13, in the streets of Kutkai town, the Kokang armed group MNDAA installed CCTV cameras. TNLA later removed the cameras and assaulted Kokang administrative staff and their soldiers, causing injuries. About a month after that incident, on the morning of March 14, the Kokang armed group launched attacks on five TNLA bases around Kutkai town simultaneously, citing as justification that TNLA had ambushed a routine MNDAA patrol.
This incident represents the escalation of a month-long simmering dispute between MNDAA and TNLA, two members of the Northern Brotherhood Alliance, into open armed clashes.
Although it was not entirely surprising that MNDAA initiated attacks against TNLA in several locations, the scale and method drew attention. Using drones and artillery to strike around five locations simultaneously, and detaining nearly 40–50 TNLA personnel stationed at the 105-Mile Kyin San Kyawt trade gate while confiscating their weapons, made the operation appear like a surprise military strike.
Since MNDAA and TNLA are two members of the same Northern Brotherhood Alliance, and generally have closer relations than with other allied groups, their fighting each other like enemies shocked many observers.
Among forces resisting the military dictatorship, several questions quickly arose:
• Has the Northern Alliance begun to fracture?
• Are these two armed groups—both maintaining ceasefires with the junta—now fighting each other instead of confronting the military regime?
At a time when the anti-dictatorship revolution is at a critical crossroads, the fact that allied groups are reaching the point of armed clashes raises fears that it could benefit the common enemy, while also causing discouragement and weakening unity within the resistance.
The roots of the current situation trace back to Operation 1027, when TNLA captured Kutkai town and surrounding areas. MNDAA also moved some of its troops into certain buildings and areas, and minor disputes and frictions had existed since that time, though they were not very visible.
Later, the two armed groups reportedly agreed to jointly administer Kutkai town, and MNDAA opened some offices there. After the second phase of Operation 1027, MNDAA also designated Kutkai as a district within its Special Region (1) administrative structure.
These developments suggest that the Kokang armed group held a position seeking a certain degree of administrative authority and control over Kutkai. After the February 13 CCTV incident, MNDAA reportedly began blocking goods, fuel, and supplies destined for Ta’ang areas, placing pressure on TNLA while preparing its forces.
When the March 14 clashes began, TNLA appeared unprepared for such an attack. In past years, TNLA had experienced similar lower-level clashes with KIA and also once or twice with MNDAA, usually treated as local friction between units. It is possible TNLA assumed the latest tensions were of the same nature and did not expect them to escalate into a large-scale offensive.
Both MNDAA and TNLA later issued official statements about the clashes, with MNDAA releasing its statement several hours earlier.
In its statement, MNDAA emphasized the February 13 incident, stating that it had sent five notifications to TNLA regarding the matter. MNDAA said it had requested that the situation in Kutkai be restored to the status before February 13 before any negotiations could take place. The statement also accused TNLA of forcibly recruiting soldiers in the Kutkai area and deliberately inciting ethnic conflicts.
MNDAA said it values the brotherhood alliance relationship and does not wish to have military confrontations with other armed groups. However, it declared that if it faces violent attacks, humiliation, or threats to its survival, it will defend itself with full force. The original statement was written in Chinese, later translated into Burmese, and observers noted that its wording sounded somewhat firm and tense.
The TNLA statement, on the other hand, listed the locations where MNDAA initiated attacks on the morning of March 14. TNLA emphasized that its actions were primarily defensive rather than retaliatory. It said that between February 13 and March 14 it had conducted no offensive activities. TNLA also accused MNDAA forces in the Kutkai–Hseni border area and in the Mongyaw area of beating 67 of its personnel with spiked clubs, detaining them, and confiscating 53 weapons, with some individuals still in custody. TNLA reiterated that disputes among allied ethnic forces should be resolved through dialogue and negotiation.
Some analysts have suggested that China may have given MNDAA a “green light” for the attack. This speculation is partly due to the timing, as China’s special envoy for Myanmar was visiting Naypyitaw shortly before the clashes, leading some commentators to link the two events. China’s influence over both the Myanmar military and ethnic armed groups also fuels such “conspiracy theories.” The fact that the Kokang population uses Chinese language and script further encourages narratives portraying them as proxies of China. In Myanmar politics, anti-China narratives often gain traction even without solid evidence.
However, rather than attributing the conflict solely to hidden manipulation or accidental friction, it is important to recognize that the confrontation is rooted in real disputes over territorial administration, natural resources, and recruitment of soldiers.
The incident also highlights an important lesson for ethnic armed organizations:
the definitions of allies and enemies should be based on political goals, shared objectives, and respect for local populations—not merely on competing interests.