Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Viewpoint of November 30
(MoeMaKa) 1 December 2025
What is the NUG, where is the NUG, and what is the outlook for the Spring Revolution?
As the National Unity Government (NUG), formed two and a half months after the coup, approaches its fifth year, calls for reform and restructuring have started to emerge — not only among NUG supporters, but also among those who support the Spring Revolution and are striving to end military dictatorship.
Why do people say the NUG needs reform? There will be many reasons given, but the main one is probably this general view:
To reach the goal of ending the dictatorship more quickly, the NUG’s current structure and way of operating needs to be revised.
Some also argue that:
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The NUG is structured too much like a “normal period government,”
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And not enough like a revolutionary wartime government,
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So it fails to push the revolution forward as effectively as it should.
Another current of opinion is this:
If the NUG’s goals and objectives put military victory at the center, then leadership in military affairs should be in the hands of people with real military experience and expertise.
Critics say that many of the current military leaders do not have proper military backgrounds, and that those positions should instead be given to experienced, professional commanders.
Another reform view is that unnecessary ministries should be removed and the government made leaner and more compact. Some believe that the large number of ministries leads to extra, avoidable operating costs.
On top of that, other criticisms say:
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The NUG’s handling of donations, fundraising, and tax revenues collected in liberated areas
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Has been weak in systematic financial management,
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Has seen misuse and unfair distribution,
and that these issues also justify the need for reform.
As the revolution nears its fifth year, there have already been cases in which district- and township-level Pa-Ka-Fa / Pa-Ah-Pha bodies have been arrested or exposed for financial corruption, with amounts ranging from tens of millions of kyat up to hundreds of millions. These cases reinforce the views mentioned above.
Recently, there have even been complaints that civil servants under the NUG Prime Minister’s Office Minister of State have misused funds and used them for personal benefit. The alleged incidents are not brand-new; they go back some time. But they are now being brought to public attention at the very moment when talk of the need for NUG reform is spreading widely — which suggests people chose this timing to file their complaints.
Some reports say that the NUG itself held a reform meeting around the last week of August or the first week of September. But nearly three months later, the NUG leadership has still not publicly shared the results of that meeting with the public.
There have been rumors that:
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Some ministries will be turned into commissions or departments under the Prime Minister’s Office,
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And that certain ministries would be restructured.
Some news reports even claimed that the Ministry of Human Rights would be reorganized as a commission. But there has been no clear, official statement from the NUG on these matters so far.
In recent days, the Minister for International Cooperation has told at least one media outlet that he has submitted his resignation from the NUG. That invites the question of whether this resignation followed on from the NUG reform meeting held a few months ago. It can be inferred that decisions on structural changes have already been made within the NUG. The meeting in Brussels, Belgium appears to have produced decisions to streamline ministries and make the cabinet more compact — but again, these have not yet been publicly explained.
Beyond organizational reform, there is another area the NUG will likely need to reconsider:
The strategy and pathway of the Spring Revolution itself — that is, the path to ending military dictatorship.
Questions the NUG must revisit include:
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Will the dictatorship be ended primarily by armed struggle, pursued all the way to victory?
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If so, with which forces will joint commands be formed?
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With which groups will the NUG form alliances?
These are strategic questions that need to be reviewed and confirmed.
Five years after the coup, we also need to ask:
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Have relations between the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the NUG grown stronger, or have they deteriorated?
The answer will have a direct impact on the future of the Spring Revolution.
The state of relations:
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Before Operation 1027,
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After 1027’s campaigns,
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And now in 2025,
is clearly not the same.
After two major EAOs agreed to ceasefires — under Chinese pressure, and citing the need to hold and govern the territories they had gained — their choices have inevitably affected relations between:
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The NUG, and
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The ethnic armed organizations as a whole.
Given these changes, and the shifting situation on the ground, the NUG must restructure itself more tightly and also ensure that those given responsibility:
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Have the skills and competence needed for the role,
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Are honest,
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And are willing to make sacrifices and tough choices for the revolution.
For over three to four million people displaced inside the country, forced to flee their homes,
and four to six million Burmese who have left the country and are working abroad,
there are immense hopes pinned on the Spring Revolution.
Ensuring those hopes are not betrayed or extinguished ultimately depends on the conduct and capability of the revolutionary forces themselves.