Myanmar Spring Chronicle – View from September 9
(MoeMaKa), September 10, 2025
Are fractures showing in the “military commission” election even before it starts?
After the 2021 coup, the junta rebranded itself as a “Military Commission” in 2025 and has been preparing to hold another election under the 2008 Constitution around the end of 2025. During July–August it noticeably ramped up its messaging about proceeding with the new Election in end of 2025.
Among neighboring countries, China and India have displayed accepting, even supportive, attitudes toward the election the Military Commission wants to stage, and ASEAN—of which Myanmar is a member—has not issued much criticism. Ceasefire ethnic armed groups have largely stayed quiet, and some have even publicly said they support the Military Commission’s election.
On September 6, DKBA Chief of Staff Maj.-Gen. Saw Sein Win told reporters that the DKBA would cooperate with and back the election: “We see it simply as the event to choose people’s representatives. We’ll go and support the event to choose MPs.” Similarly, the Karen State Border Guard Force (BGF) announced on September 3 that it would help the military with the election, according to DVB.
The junta has said the election will not be held nationwide all at once, but in segmented phases. Sixty-three townships remain under a declared state of emergency, with 90 days of direct military administration by regional commanders, and analysts say over 60% of Myanmar’s territory is insecure due to the conflict. With vast numbers of people displaced, there is no realistic way to conduct a credible census, compile new voter lists, or publish them accurately. Beyond the lack of clarity on voter rolls, there is still no definitive list of parties and candidates that will run. The election commission has not been able to release a clear timetable either.
At present, many citizens lack proper IDs; population figures are unreliable; large numbers have moved from their original homes; many are living under guest-registration systems; and “smart cards” are being used more to monitor individuals’ movements than to provide orderly documentation. Under these conditions—be it absentee/advance voting or in-person voting—the backbone for accepting and counting votes is simply not robust.
What the Military Commission can state clearly and firmly is that, under the 2008 Constitution, 25% of seats in every legislature can be directly appointed in advance by the military. Since those 25% of MPs will cover the whole country by default, no ballot boxes are needed for them. On top of that, with the Military Commission’s backing behind the USDP (the Union Solidarity and Development Party) and similar forces, they can again orchestrate lopsided advantages—like in the 2010 election—to win uncontested or on “preloaded” votes. In short, they can forcibly create a sham election and a sham parliament without international recognition.
However, for genuine political or military change, they would also need recognition of the election results by neighboring countries and acceptance by ASEAN, and—most importantly—inside the country they must use this “political exit” they are advertising to lure citizens who are under immense hardship. They want at least some percentage of the public to vote, or at minimum to stay silent and acquiesce, thereby distancing ordinary people from the resistance, NUG, and EROs.
Yet it seems increasingly clear—even to the Military Commission—that it lacks confidence in its own plan. While it calls for participation and cooperation, the junta has not stopped its bitter denunciations of the 2020 election results. It dissolved the winning NLD, jailed Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint and keeps them imprisoned, and continues detaining political opponents. Militarily, it is still escalating air attacks that kill innocent civilians. To prove any sincere commitment to its electoral promises, the Commission would need to declare a unilateral ceasefire now, proclaim a full amnesty, show genuine movement toward a peace process to end the civil war, and demonstrate magnanimity—none of which it has. Reports say Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s health is not good, yet the Commission appears to lack the stature to release her and all political prisoners unconditionally as a sign of goodwill.
A final, telling example: the Commission even dissolved a political party formed by former NLD members—one that had pledged to recognize and participate in the junta’s election. News reports put it this way, highlighting the junta’s bad faith:
Election Commission announces dissolution of four parties including the NDF.
The Election Commission of the Military Commission today announced it has dissolved four parties that had been preparing to contest the election the military says it will hold this December. The dissolved parties include the National Democratic Force (NDF), the Democratic National Politics Party (DNP), the Women’s Party (Mon), and the Union Farmers and Workers Party.
The Commission cited failure to meet required membership numbers and office requirements. The NDF was formed by former NLD members who split from Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD to contest the 2010 election. The party had expressed support for the new election led by coup leader Sr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing. Some well-known former NLD figures, including ex-MP Daw Sandar Min, had defected to NDF to take part in the military’s election—only to see the party dissolved before the poll.
All this lays bare that the junta’s electoral path is saturated with dishonesty, illegality, manipulation, and brute domination. The “political exit” and “military exit” it envisions simply mean ensuring total victory for its own camp at the ballot box and, on the battlefield, crushing to the end both the people who oppose it and the armed resisters.