Myanmar Spring Chronicle – July 3 Perspective
(MoeMaKa, July 4, 2025)
Junta Fighter Jet Crashes in Phar Saung Township
Amid intense fighting in recent weeks in Phar Saung Township of Karenni (Kayah) State, a junta fighter jet reportedly lost contact during a “nighttime long-range training flight,” according to a statement released on July 2. On July 3, aircraft wreckage was found near Kyauk Lone Gyi village in Phar Saung (Hpruso), with the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) claiming that resistance forces had shot it down.
Just about a month earlier, during a battle to seize the Kandaung police station in Sagaing Region, another fighter jet supporting the junta was downed. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) claimed responsibility for that incident.
Both downed aircraft in these incidents were Chinese-made fighter jets.
The most recent crash reportedly involved two junta air force pilots, both of whom were killed in the crash and subsequent fire, according to available evidence.
If high-speed, maneuverable jet fighters are now being successfully shot down, it raises questions about whether resistance forces have acquired effective anti-aircraft weapons.
Regardless of whether these aircraft were shot down or crashed, any reduction in the number of aircraft used in the junta’s notorious airstrikes is seen as positive news. Including recent incidents, approximately 10 aircraft have been lost over the past two years. While this is not a crippling number for an air force reportedly possessing around 200 aircraft, it is still significant.
Recent reports also note that junta chief Min Aung Hlaing visited Russia and Belarus in an apparent effort to purchase more military helicopters.
However, participation in the junta air force has now become a dangerous role — with a growing risk of being killed or captured. At least one pilot has reportedly been taken into custody by resistance forces. In most other incidents, pilots died alongside the downed aircraft or helicopters.
The junta’s air force has been essential for delivering reinforcements, supplies, and weapons; gathering intelligence; and launching aerial bombings on resistance forces, administration centers, monasteries, and schools. Daily, aircraft and helicopters are deployed to support ground operations, increasing the likelihood of shoot-downs or crashes.
Although some advocacy campaigns have sought to block the junta’s access to aviation fuel, the military still seems able to acquire it — sometimes through intermediaries like Vietnam, or directly from China, both of which are not far from Myanmar. This means the junta’s air operations remain relatively uninterrupted.
Efforts to block spare parts and aircraft sales have also had limited impact, as most of the junta’s aircraft are produced by China and Russia, countries that are unlikely to heed international pressure. As a result, global campaigns have not yet meaningfully grounded the junta’s air force.
The junta continues to rely on air power as a central tool in areas where ground control is tenuous. These airstrikes cause significant civilian casualties, increasing anti-junta sentiment. Yet, from the junta’s perspective, they help prevent further loss of territory to resistance forces.
Ahead of the junta’s stated intention to hold elections by the end of the year, it is trying to retake ethnic-controlled territories. Air support is a key part of this strategy. For example, junta forces have been gradually advancing toward Naung Cho in northern Shan State, while bombing Kyaukme town daily to displace the civilian population.
In northern Shan State, the junta relies heavily on air power to counter the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) as it attempts to seize Bhamo and nearby military bases. Though the KIA recently downed a helicopter with a drone strike, it has yet to fully capture Bhamo or the 21 strategic junta bases surrounding it.
In Karenni (Kayah) State, the junta recently lost a battalion in Phar Saung (Hpruso), but retook the border town of Moebye, which connects to southern Shan State.
For the junta, airstrikes and air support remain a central strategy — not only for military gains but also to intimidate and destabilize resistance governance in reclaimed territories. This scorched-earth approach is likely to continue as part of their broader strategy.
The junta also seems to be heavily relying on air power in its bid to regain some ethnic-controlled areas before holding its planned election. In recent days, heavy bombardment of Kyaukme aims to displace the population. Similarly, in Kachin State’s southeast, the KIA has clashed with the junta for control of Banmaw and surrounding military bases, with air support playing a key role in delaying the KIA’s advance.