Myanmar Spring Chronicle – July 4 Perspective
(MoeMaKa, July 5, 2025)
Are the Junta’s Recent Offensives Connected to the Upcoming Election?
Since the campaign known as “Operation 1027” began in October 2023, the junta has received praise for its rapid territorial gains, including the capture of strategic areas and even detaining enemy commanders—achievements that continued into mid‑2024.
However, from late 2024 into early 2025, this momentum shifted. The resistance has successfully counterattacked, pushing back junta forces and reclaiming territory. With increased troop numbers, new drone warfare tactics, and more consistent air support, signs now suggest the junta might be reorienting its strategy to take back lost ground.
For example, in April the junta retook Lashio. And in Naung Cho–Taung Kham, a strategically critical corridor along the Mandalay–Muse road, junta forces have pushed back resistance fighters, drawing perilously close to Naung Cho itself. If Naung Cho falls, the next front could be Kyaukme. Similarly, Thibaw—held by TNLA—may soon be retargeted once the junta secures surrounding towns. Meanwhile, MNDAA‑held Tangyan could be the focus of renewed negotiations with Chinese mediation instead of outright attack.
In eastern Kachin State—bordering northern Shan—the junta has held off KIA offensives around Banmaw for over six months. Death and injury are mounting on both sides—a grim sign of prolonged standoff.
Meanwhile, in Hpakant, Kachin State, it’s reported the junta deployed 700–1,000 troops in a counterattack and reclaimed some smaller base areas with local militia support. This raises questions about whether the KIA’s offensive capacity is reaching its limits.
In Chin State, though there haven’t been major offensives recently, junta troops have started advancing from the Kale region into central and northern Chin via Kale–Mindat path. Chin resistance fighters are actively attempting to block these routes.
On Rakhine frontlines—such as Kyauktaw and Minbya townships—fierce fighting continues. Junta forces are aggressively fortifying naval and ground positions while the Arakan Army (AA) engages as an intermediary force, possibly seeking to expand its territorial control.
In Karenni (Kayah) State, resistance forces have lost Moebye in recent days, while simultaneously capturing a junta base in Phar Saung (Hpruso). Earlier in 1027’s initial phase, the resistance held many wards in Loikaw town but eventually lost them to a junta counteroffensive.
In Karen State, the KNU/KNLA has captured numerous border outposts. However, Mawhtaw—the town they initially attempted to seize early last year—now appears to be back under junta control as they struggle to secure routes along the Mawhtaw–Kawkareik international road.
In Tanintharyi Region, while notable town battles have been rare, KNU/KNLA forces did seize a junta camp at the Thayawaddy border trade zone.
In central Myanmar—Sagaing, Mandalay, Magway, and Bago divisions—small-scale resistance activities continue, such as the capture of the Kandaw police station. Large-scale town sieges like those in Myingyan, Myawaddy, or Pakokku in 2022–23 haven’t been seen recently, though fierce clashes are ongoing in places like Myaing, Palè, Yinmarpin, and Myittha.
Nationwide, the junta has not suffered any massive territorial losses in 2025. But retaking towns and certain camps has reinvigorated the military’s morale to some extent.
This situation raises questions: is the junta intentionally recovering territories ahead of the promised election—to expand the number of constituencies they can hold, for legitimacy? Or are they using these offensives purely to maintain control and prevent the breakdown of state authority?
It seems more likely that the junta is launching targeted military actions mainly to preserve its authority and stave off collapse—rather than to genuinely prepare for a legitimate election.