Myanmar Spring Chronicle – June 9 View
(MoeMaKa, June 10, 2025):
TNLA Orders PDFs to Withdraw from Controlled Areas; Rumors of MNDAA Handing Over Theinni in September Emerge
According to DVB, TNLA has issued instructions for PDF resistance forces in Naungcho Township to withdraw from certain areas. Citing a source close to the PDFs, the report states that TNLA ordered the PDF unit in Naungcho Gyi to vacate within three days, and from Naung Ohn within two days. The message was reportedly delivered in person via motorcycle messengers.
The PDF groups interpret the withdrawal orders as TNLA preparing to hand over the area to the junta. The report also noted that TNLA’s military gear was being transported in freight trucks, and that the junta had begun occupying three villages soon after the PDF withdrawal.
It is still unclear whether this development results from a formal agreement, behind-the-scenes negotiation, or intense external pressure.
In an earlier article, it was suggested that TNLA’s recent withdrawals in Naungcho may be more politically motivated than due to direct military defeat, yet are being presented as tactical pullbacks.
The day after that analysis, news broke that TNLA had indeed ordered PDFs to withdraw from parts of Naungcho Township. This strongly suggests that some level of negotiation or coordination between TNLA and the junta is ongoing, possibly under Chinese pressure.
Meanwhile, TNLA announced the establishment of a new administrative structure: the Ta’ang Land Council (TLC), the highest governing authority in Ta’ang areas. It was formed during a June 1–3 meeting of the Ta’ang Political Consultative Council (TPCC), which includes representatives from TNLA, the Ta’ang National Party, and civil society groups.
The Chair of the TLC is General Tar Aik Bong, leader of the TNLA. The nine-member body includes three from TNLA, three from the political party, and three from civil society.
While TNLA had captured large territories from the junta since mid-2023 and administered them during the interim period, the sudden formation of a high-level council raises questions. It may reflect a shift from military expansion to solidifying political control over existing territory, possibly because further military advances are no longer planned.
It could also be an attempt to formalize TNLA’s governance over areas captured during the 2023–2024 campaign by framing them as TLC-administered territories, giving political legitimacy to their military control.
However, the timing of this political announcement—just as TNLA is withdrawing from contested zones in Naungcho—suggests it may be linked to ongoing political and military negotiations.
In a related development, DVB reports that the MNDAA plans to hand over Theinni (Hseni) to the junta by September, citing an anonymous source. The handover is said to be similar to what happened with Lashio, and it appears that MNDAA is preparing to surrender additional towns it captured along the China-Myanmar trade corridor.
Four more towns—Kutkai, Hsipaw, Kyaukme, and Naungcho—along this corridor are still under Brotherhood control. Pressure from China, possibly tied to its BRI (Belt and Road Initiative), may be pushing for these towns to be returned to the junta to avoid renewed fighting and ensure stable logistics.
MNDAA’s handover of Lashio earlier this year dealt a serious blow to hopes that military gains in northern Shan could serve as a launchpad for advances toward central Myanmar, including Mandalay and Naypyidaw. Although NUG and ethnic armed groups may have had some form of coordination, many believed the Operation 1027 offensive had broader goals than simply holding territory in Shan.
While coordination exists among ethnic armed groups, PDFs under the NUG, regional LPDFs, and other forces, disagreements over territory, conflicting interests, and diverging political goals remain serious obstacles. These tensions could create openings for the military junta to regain control.
Thus, it is increasingly urgent for opposition forces to confront these realities honestly and engage in transparent dialogue over what shared interests exist—and where interests may be in conflict—if they hope to challenge the junta in a unified way.