“Myanmar Spring Chronicle – June 8 View”
(MoeMaKa, June 9, 2025):
TNLA Gradually Retreating from Held Territories Under Chinese Pressure
As relations between China and Myanmar’s military junta have improved, ethnic armed groups based in northern Shan State and northeastern Myanmar—especially those located near the Chinese border—are being forced to recalibrate their military goals. Specifically, this involves the MNDAA (Kokang), TNLA (Ta’ang), and KIA (Kachin). The AA (Arakan Army), though part of the Brotherhood Alliance, operates primarily in Rakhine State and does not rely on China in the same strategic way—particularly for trade and military transit routes. However, that doesn’t necessarily mean it’s fully free from Chinese influence either.
Up until mid-2024, the Three Brotherhood Alliance saw rapid battlefield success. But by August 2024, shifts in China’s policy led ethnic armed groups to reevaluate their territorial control and military advances. The MNDAA formally agreed to a ceasefire with the junta following pressure from China.
While there’s no public statement from the KIA and TNLA confirming similar agreements, it is widely assumed that China has also been pressuring or negotiating with them. However, specific details from the groups themselves remain undisclosed.
Recently, the TNLA, which had held Naungcho town for about a year and maintained frontlines far beyond its outskirts (such as at Taung Kham), began retreating. The clashes have now reached close to Naungcho itself, causing residents to flee for the second time.
By the end of 2023 and into 2024, TNLA had seized control of as many as 12 towns and established administration. However, in some areas, it removed long-standing ethnic markers, faced friction with other anti-junta forces, and relocated troops and liaison offices, indicating internal tensions.
These dynamics have affected unity among resistance groups, especially in northern Shan. The joint goal of dismantling the military dictatorship that seemed strong during the early phase of Operation 1027 now appears to have weakened. Many of the groups that participated in the initial or second phases no longer seem aligned with the same Spring Revolution ideals.
While it’s unclear exactly how previous agreements were made, public statements by the Brotherhood Alliance during the operation had pledged a full fight to remove the military regime. Many hoped Operation 1027 would lead beyond Shan State and even reach Naypyidaw.
However, such hopes have waned since late last year. The MNDAA’s ceasefire and their withdrawal from Lashio, as well as recent clashes between ethnic forces, have all contributed. After gaining territory, some groups shifted focus to administration, taxation, and resource extraction, appearing to prioritize their own interests over collective revolutionary goals.
In addition to China’s diplomatic pressure, these internal challenges have slowed territorial expansion into central Myanmar and halted momentum in northern Shan.
Now, TNLA’s capacity to hold Naungcho, and whether it can continue to maintain control of key towns like Kyaukme and Hsipaw, is in question. These issues raise broader concerns about the sustainability of its gains.
Furthermore, speculation has emerged that, unlike MNDAA—which publicly agreed to a ceasefire—TNLA may attempt to avoid reputational damage by quietly retreating from conflict zones under the guise of defensive repositioning. This is prompting theories of behind-the-scenes deals or understandings.
The dramatic momentum of Operation 1027 in northern Shan has slowed. Whether TNLA and other forces can retain their current territories increasingly depends on the geopolitical calculations and strategic designs of neighboring China.