Myanmar Spring Chronicle – May 6 Perspective
MoeMaKa, May 7, 2025
Military Leader to Attend Red Square Parade as Russia-backed Ceasefire Extends One More Month
On May 5, the military council declared a unilateral ceasefire extension of nearly one more month, citing the need for rescue and reconstruction following a powerful earthquake that struck Sagaing, Mandalay, and Pyin Oo Lwin, killing around 4,000 people and causing widespread devastation.
Similar to the military council, other armed groups such as the Northern Alliance (Three Brotherhood Alliance), the National Unity Government (NUG), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), and others had already announced their own ceasefires since early April. However, these declarations are not the result of mutually negotiated ceasefire agreements with shared rules of engagement or enforcement mechanisms. Consequently, clashes have continued on the ground, and the military council persists in launching airstrikes.
These unilateral ceasefires lack specific enforcement provisions, containing only general statements about defensive actions and the avoidance of offensive operations. In contrast, genuine ceasefire agreements between warring parties typically include negotiations on troop movements, reinforcements, and positions, culminating in formal agreements. The current situation, however, lacks such mutual understanding and verification mechanisms. There are no monitoring bodies in place, and there are no agreed-upon protocols for communication if the ceasefire is breached. As such, these unilateral ceasefire declarations appear to serve political and strategic purposes rather than a genuine cessation of hostilities.
International bodies like the UN and ASEAN have expressed faint hopes that the earthquake might lead to a halt in the fighting, but the responses from both the military council and armed groups — issuing ceasefire declarations without follow-through — indicate otherwise.
It would not be wrong to say that Myanmar’s ongoing armed conflict is not yet in a state conducive to peace talks or lasting ceasefire arrangements. Some ethnic armed organizations have gained significant territorial control, while the junta hopes to regain lost ground through renewed offensives — and possibly through pressure exerted by neighboring China.
Over the past month, the military council has continued to lose territory and outposts. The only significant recapture appears to be Lashio, a key strategic town in northern Shan State. Meanwhile, it has lost additional bases in Karen State.
China, for its part, seems focused on preventing armed actors with close ties to the U.S. — politically or militarily — from gaining ground in Myanmar. It uses diplomatic, economic, and border trade channels as tools to influence the situation. China’s push for a ceasefire may offer the junta temporary relief from military pressure. Still, the extent of China’s influence and which parties it will pressure next remains to be seen.
Meanwhile, another noteworthy development is that, reportedly at the invitation of Russian President Vladimir Putin, the junta leader will attend the upcoming Victory Day parade in Moscow. This event commemorates the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany during World War II and is held annually in Russia.
This visit would mark the junta leader’s second trip to Russia in just over two months. Previously, he had traveled to both Russia and Belarus, another close ally of Moscow. The invitation to join global leaders at the Red Square parade underscores the growing relationship between the Myanmar junta and Russia.
As Myanmar’s ties with China are revived, we also see the junta striving to deepen its defense and diplomatic engagement with Russia — a country that continues to provide military supplies, training, and a level of international legitimacy.
The earthquake also gave the junta an opportunity to break some of the diplomatic isolation it has faced. Aid appeals citing humanitarian needs have prompted engagement, and although ASEAN has not officially invited the junta back to formal summits, informal meetings are taking place — something the military council may see as a diplomatic win.
Globally, with Donald Trump possibly returning to the U.S. presidency, the international order could shift toward isolationism, reduced aid, and increased tariffs, with a renewed focus on resource extraction. This could allow Russia and China to expand their diplomatic influence, giving authoritarian regimes like Myanmar’s military junta more room to maneuver on the world stage.