Myanmar Spring Chronicle – March 17 Overview
MoeMaKa, March 18, 2025
How Will the Rohingya Refugee Crisis Be Resolved?
During his visit to Cox’s Bazar, where Rohingya refugees are currently residing in Bangladesh, UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated that discussions with the Arakan Army (AA), which now controls vast areas of Rakhine State, are necessary regarding the future of these refugees.
The Rohingya crisis initially erupted during the administration of President Thein Sein, who came to power after the 2011 elections. Communal conflicts between Rohingya and other local communities began, followed by further clashes in 2013 and 2014 in cities like Thandwe and Kyaukphyu. The situation escalated in August 2017 when the ARSA armed group attacked border security posts. The military responded with a brutal crackdown, resulting in the deaths of thousands, including women and children, and forcing nearly one million Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh.
Since then, more than seven years have passed, but a clear solution for the Rohingya refugees remains elusive. Many Western nations have classified the 2017 military clearance operations as genocide, leading to a case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against Myanmar. In 2019, then-leader of the NLD government, Aung San Suu Kyi, personally defended Myanmar in this case.
After the military coup in 2021, the focus on resolving the Rohingya crisis diminished as internal armed conflicts escalated. The international community’s refusal to recognize the military junta further complicated efforts to address the refugee issue, shifting global attention toward restoring democracy in Myanmar. Resistance groups prioritized overthrowing the military regime, believing that resolving the Rohingya crisis would be easier under a democratic government.
In this context, the United League of Arakan (ULA) and the Arakan Army (AA) launched an offensive in late 2023, seizing control of significant parts of Rakhine State. Now, over a year later, they are poised to take key locations such as Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, including a deep-sea port linked to Chinese investments.
With the AA controlling roughly 90% of Rakhine State, the question arises: Will they facilitate the repatriation of Rohingya refugees? Bangladesh, the host country for the refugees, may need to negotiate with the AA, but recognizing the ULA/AA as a legitimate governing body poses diplomatic challenges.
Meanwhile, Bangladesh is experiencing internal political instability under a caretaker government, making it unlikely to develop a new policy for handling the Rohingya crisis. A more concrete approach may emerge once an elected government is in place.
The UN, responsible for aiding Rohingya refugees, is also facing severe funding shortages for humanitarian assistance, increasing the urgency for a repatriation solution.
During the three years before the 2021 coup, the NLD government attempted to implement repatriation programs, but differences in approach between the government and aid organizations—particularly regarding citizenship rights and dignified resettlement—led to limited success.
After the coup, Myanmar’s military saw repatriation as a way to gain international recognition. However, refugees distrusted any initiative led by the same military that had previously carried out mass atrocities, causing these efforts to fail.
The Rohingya issue remains deeply intertwined with Myanmar’s democracy movement. Key questions persist: Does democracy inherently include recognizing fundamental human rights for all, including the Rohingya? Can historical mistrust between communities be overcome? Political and military stakeholders must engage in dialogue to find solutions that align with democratic principles and justice.