Myanmar Spring Chronicle – February 23 Overview
MoeMaKa, February 24, 2025
Territorial Battles and the Nationwide Situation
Following the military coup on February 1, 2021, the armed resistance movement was initiated a few weeks later by protest groups and some NLD parliament members and party leaders. This movement aimed to dismantle the military dictatorship through armed struggle.
Through the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), the General Strike Committee, and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), the National Unity Government (NUG) and the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) were formed. As the political opposition took shape, long-established ethnic armed groups gained more recruits, while new ethnic armed organizations emerged in various regions, including Karenni/Kayah, Chin State, Mon State, and non-Shan ethnic groups in Shan State.
Now, after four years since the coup and nearly four years since the formation of the armed resistance, it is time to assess the political and military progress of this strategy. The “National Unity Government,” a name conceived right after the NLD’s victory in the 2020 election, must now reflect on how much of its original goal has been achieved. Although victory seems near and significant change is expected, questions remain: How much territory has actually been secured? What challenges persist? What does the near future hold in terms of successes or obstacles?
While the NUG aims to establish a federal union in Myanmar, some powerful ethnic armed groups push for a confederation model that grants more autonomy than a federal structure. For instance, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) has been operating in a confederation-like manner for years, while the Arakan Army (AA), after its significant territorial gains in the October 2023 “Operation 1027,” has openly stated its aspirations for a confederation-level status within Myanmar rather than just a federal state.
By 2025, following the two phases of Operation 1027, the territorial control of northeastern, northern, and western Myanmar has significantly shifted. Ethnic armed groups like the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Kokang MNDAA have seized substantial areas, whereas the territories captured by NUG-aligned PDFs remain relatively smaller in comparison.
The unpredictability of the next year or two leaves many unanswered questions: Which regions will fall under the control of armed resistance forces? How much of Yangon, Bago, Magway, Sagaing, and Mandalay will the PDF forces manage to seize? The lack of centralized command, standard military structures, and coordinated strategies among NUG’s PDF units remains a challenge.
Additionally, the collaboration and power-sharing agreements between ethnic armed groups and the NUG remain uncertain. While discussions have likely taken place, strong agreements and formalized partnerships have yet to materialize. Some ethnic armed groups maintain close ties with the NUG, while others remain distant.
China, considering its broader geopolitical strategy, remains cautious in its stance toward the NUG. Some armed groups operating near China’s border have been careful to avoid association with the NUG, reflecting China’s wary approach to Myanmar’s evolving political landscape.
With nearly four years of resistance under slogans like “Spring Revolution” and “Armed Revolution,” the endurance of the people remains a critical factor. The prolonged conflict has displaced around four million people internally, while hundreds of thousands have fled abroad to escape forced military conscription or seek livelihoods. The strain on the civilian population is evident.
It is undeniable that the military junta has faced significant setbacks over the past four years. However, a critical assessment is needed to determine which resistance forces have achieved their objectives and which have not. The resilience and sacrifices of the people must also be acknowledged as the struggle continues.