Myanmar Spring Chronicle – January 31 Scene
MoeMaKa, February 1, 2025
7th Extension of the Military Coup Council’s Rule
A day before February 1, marking exactly four years since the military coup, the military council convened a meeting of its fully controlled Defense and Security Council. Citing Article 425 of the 2008 Constitution, they announced the extension of their rule for another six months for the seventh time.
The pattern remains the same: a staged meeting, discussions about the need for security and stability before elections can be held, and ultimately, a pre-scripted decision to extend their rule. The entire process is nothing more than a rubber-stamping exercise dictated by the military junta.
Due to speculations that elections might be held in 2025—though most people remain skeptical—there were also rumors about whether the military would hand power over to the Defense and Security Council before February 1 this time. However, instead of transferring power, the junta decided to continue holding onto its rule for another six months. Even if power had been handed over, the council consists mostly of junta members, so no real change would have occurred. The extension means that there is no indication of an election being held within the next six months.
Since the military coup, every time a term extension is announced—either on January 31 before February 1, or on July 31 before August 1—the junta has made some reshuffles within its ranks. They replace some officials, promote others, and reassign positions, but the top two military leaders have remained unchanged and have even strengthened their grip on power. This marks the seventh such extension.
However, the public has lost interest in this six-month cycle of political theater. The script and storyline remain unchanged, and most people are aware of the lack of any real transformation. The junta’s meetings do not openly address the reality of losing control over territories and cities. Instead, they use vague terms like “security and stability concerns” as justification for extending their rule.
Min Aung Hlaing, the junta leader, appears unwilling to acknowledge the actual situation on the ground. Whether this is due to a refusal to accept reality or because he sees no other viable option remains unclear.
Shrinking Control Over Territories
One undeniable fact is that with each six-month extension, the junta’s control over territory has diminished. The situation today is vastly different from the previous extension, and no one can predict how much control they will retain in the next six months. However, it is almost certain that they will lose more ground.
Currently, the junta has lost control of around 90 cities, two regional military headquarters, several State and Regional General Administration Departments, and at least four or five border trade outposts.
Over the next six months, the likelihood of losing more areas—including Bamar-majority regions like Sagaing, Magway, Bago, and Ayeyarwady—is high. However, as the military’s losses mount, resistance groups are also facing challenges in maintaining unity and coordination. The conflict over tax collection and territorial control among armed resistance groups is increasing, leading to internal clashes at various levels.
Meanwhile, in territories no longer under the junta’s control, illegal extraction of natural resources, deforestation, and environmental destruction are widespread. Mining activities, particularly in Sagaing, Kachin, Magway, and Tanintharyi, are intensifying, causing significant environmental damage.
Economic Hardship and Displacement
The worsening conflict has driven up costs for civilians trying to escape conscription or flee conflict zones. Travel expenses have skyrocketed, with fares reaching between 100,000 to 500,000 kyats per person in many areas.
Ordinary citizens are increasingly unable to focus on livelihoods, education, or basic survival, as they must prioritize avoiding conscription and escaping war zones. Many are depleting their savings just to secure safety for their families.
The impact of the coup has affected every socioeconomic layer—from those wielding weapons and power to business elites, skilled professionals, private sector employees, laborers, and farmers. However, the heaviest burden falls on ordinary citizens, who not only suffer from rising living costs but also from arbitrary taxation and extortion by both the military and armed groups.
Ultimately, the people at the lowest levels of society bear the greatest suffering—caught in a war they did not choose, struggling to survive under a collapsing economy and an oppressive military regime.