Myanmar Spring Chronicle – January 10 Perspective
By MoeMaKa, January 11, 2025
Online Scam Operations at the Thai Border and China’s Influence
In late 2023, online scam operations in northern Shan State intensified to alarming levels. In this context, three armed groups under the Northern Alliance took advantage of China’s concerns, positioning the crackdown on online scams as a justification for launching a military campaign known as “Operation 1027” against territories under junta control. Many observers have concluded that China supported the operation, aligning with its desire to suppress these fraudulent activities.
While there is no concrete evidence proving whether China’s role involved direct orders, encouragement, or even logistical support like weapons and technology for the Northern Alliance, the situation highlights China’s strategic interests in the region.
Operation 1027 and its Implications
The second phase of Operation 1027, conducted in July and August 2024, reportedly resulted in outcomes contrary to China’s preferences. This development coincided with incidents near the Thai-Myanmar border, such as the recent abduction of a well-known Chinese actor under the pretext of filming a movie. The actor was lured to Myanmar from Bangkok via Mae Sot and subsequently lost contact. After intervention by the Chinese Embassy and Thai police, the actor was rescued with the help of armed groups led by Saw Chit Thu in Myawaddy District.
Such incidents have drawn significant attention to the online scam operations in the region and led to further revelations of similar cases involving Chinese nationals. These events have sparked speculation about whether China might escalate pressure on border regions like the KNU-controlled areas where these activities are rampant.
Armed Groups and Their Roles in Karen State
In Karen State, the active armed groups include the KNLA, KNA (formerly BGF), DKBA, and junta forces. Questions are now being raised about which group bears direct responsibility for the continued survival of scam operations in Myawaddy. While the KNA seems most implicated, it operated under the junta’s influence until the early stages of the coup. The situation has since evolved, with China-junta relations also shifting significantly since late 2023.
Strategic Concerns and China’s Stance
In regions like Kokang, which borders China, scam operations have been tied to groups tolerated or even backed by the junta. China has demonstrated the ability to influence the situation to some extent. However, the circumstances at the Thai-Myanmar border differ, involving actors more aligned with Thailand and less under junta control. This divergence suggests that the 2023 scenarios may not directly replicate here.
China’s Potential Actions
One possibility is that China might pressure both the junta and Thailand to suppress scam operations. Given China’s significant economic ties with Thailand, Beijing could leverage these relationships to achieve its objectives.
Expansion of Scam Operations
Online scams have expanded beyond northern Shan State and Myawaddy to areas like KK Park and the Three Pagodas Pass. In these regions, where the junta’s influence is minimal, groups like the DKBA reportedly provide protection for scam activities.
Conclusion
While China may increase pressure on scam operations near the Thai-Myanmar border, it is unlikely to adopt a uniform approach as it does in northern Shan State. The complex dynamics involving armed groups, cross-border influences, and evolving alliances will continue to shape the region’s geopolitical landscape.