Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scene of September 4
(MoeMaKa) September 5, 2024
Is Mandalay Under Threat? The Junta’s Next Moves
In the second phase of Operation 1027, following the capture of Lashio, Naung Cho, and Kyaukme in northern Shan State and Mongkut (which administratively falls under Mandalay Region but borders the northwestern part of Shan State), the TNLA and MNDAA took control of these areas within two to three months. The next target appears to be Mandalay, Myanmar’s second-largest city and the main trading hub of the upper part of the country.
The groups speculated to be preparing an attack on Mandalay include the TNLA and MDY-PDF (Mandalay-PDF), which operate in the north and northeast of the city. There are also reports that the KIA (Kachin Independence Army), which collaborates with local PDFs in areas such as Mandalay, Myingyan, Kale, Sagaing, and upper Magway, might play a role in this offensive, though this remains unclear.
Given the nature of military operations, it’s natural that there will be no pre-announcements of such actions. However, the people of Mandalay are undoubtedly eager to know whether there is a possibility of the city being captured in a military offensive. Questions arise about whether the ethnic armed groups and PDFs have sufficient coordination, weapons, ammunition, and manpower. Furthermore, the stance of China, especially given the proximity of these ethnic groups to the Chinese border, will also be a factor in assessing the likelihood of such an attack.
Even if the forces fail to capture Mandalay, an attempt to encircle and attack the city would have profound political, ideological, economic, and territorial impacts on the junta’s controlled areas. Such a scenario would also mean that Naypyidaw and the southern parts of Myanmar, including Yangon, might no longer be immune to similar attacks.
While it is true that Mandalay fell to insurgent forces back in 1949, the political dynamics today are very different. Unlike in 1949, when there was little cooperation between the government and insurgents, the armed groups opposing the central government now exhibit a degree of coordination that was absent back then. Although there remain tensions over territorial control and interests, the ethnic armed groups and PDFs are working together to a significant extent.
The aim of capturing Mandalay likely involves some level of mutual understanding among the armed groups. However, how broad this agreement is and how potential disputes over territorial control will be handled remains to be seen. These issues reflect the complexities on the side of the resistance forces, while on the junta’s side, possible moves are still unfolding.
As northern Shan and Mandalay come under focus, it’s speculated that the junta may be attempting to regain control of lost territories in some ethnic regions. In the past few days, Min Aung Hlaing, the head of the junta, has made visits to Mandalay, Mawlamyine, and on September 4, to Loikaw.
This visit to Loikaw, the capital of Kayah State, marks the first time in years that a junta leader has been there, signifying a regained sense of control over the city. Although the junta’s second-in-command, Soe Win, visited last year, the security situation deteriorated in Loikaw by the end of 2023. Now, however, it appears the junta has regained enough control to allow for such a high-profile visit.
It’s worth noting that KNDF (Karenni Nationalities Defense Force) launched a fierce attempt to recapture Loikaw in late 2023. Yet by April 2024, they had been gradually forced to retreat. The junta seems to be focused not so much on recapturing the major towns or regional military bases lost in northern Shan State but rather on reclaiming what they consider more vulnerable ethnic areas.
**Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scene of September 4**
*(Moe Ma Kha)* September 5, 2024
**Is Mandalay Under Threat? The Junta’s Next Moves**
In the second phase of Operation 1027, following the capture of Lashio, Naung Cho, and Kyaukme in northern Shan State and Mongkut (which administratively falls under Mandalay Region but borders the northwestern part of Shan State), the TNLA and MNDAA took control of these areas within two to three months. The next target appears to be Mandalay, Myanmar’s second-largest city and the main trading hub of the upper part of the country.
The groups speculated to be preparing an attack on Mandalay include the TNLA and MDY-PDF (Mandalay-PDF), which operate in the north and northeast of the city. There are also reports that the KIA (Kachin Independence Army), which collaborates with local PDFs in areas such as Mandalay, Myingyan, Kale, Sagaing, and upper Magway, might play a role in this offensive, though this remains unclear.
Given the nature of military operations, it’s natural that there will be no pre-announcements of such actions. However, the people of Mandalay are undoubtedly eager to know whether there is a possibility of the city being captured in a military offensive. Questions arise about whether the ethnic armed groups and PDFs have sufficient coordination, weapons, ammunition, and manpower. Furthermore, the stance of China, especially given the proximity of these ethnic groups to the Chinese border, will also be a factor in assessing the likelihood of such an attack.
Even if the forces fail to capture Mandalay, an attempt to encircle and attack the city would have profound political, ideological, economic, and territorial impacts on the junta’s controlled areas. Such a scenario would also mean that Naypyidaw and the southern parts of Myanmar, including Yangon, might no longer be immune to similar attacks.
While it is true that Mandalay fell to insurgent forces back in 1949, the political dynamics today are very different. Unlike in 1949, when there was little cooperation between the government and insurgents, the armed groups opposing the central government now exhibit a degree of coordination that was absent back then. Although there remain tensions over territorial control and interests, the ethnic armed groups and PDFs are working together to a significant extent.
The aim of capturing Mandalay likely involves some level of mutual understanding among the armed groups. However, how broad this agreement is and how potential disputes over territorial control will be handled remains to be seen. These issues reflect the complexities on the side of the resistance forces, while on the junta’s side, possible moves are still unfolding.
As northern Shan and Mandalay come under focus, it’s speculated that the junta may be attempting to regain control of lost territories in some ethnic regions. In the past few days, Min Aung Hlaing, the head of the junta, has made visits to Mandalay, Mawlamyine, and on September 4, to Loikaw.
This visit to Loikaw, the capital of Kayah State, marks the first time in years that a junta leader has been there, signifying a regained sense of control over the city. Although the junta’s second-in-command, Soe Win, visited last year, the security situation deteriorated in Loikaw by the end of 2023. Now, however, it appears the junta has regained enough control to allow for such a high-profile visit.
It’s worth noting that KNDF (Karenni Nationalities Defense Force) launched a fierce attempt to recapture Loikaw in late 2023. Yet by April 2024, they had been gradually forced to retreat. The junta seems to be focused not so much on recapturing the major towns or regional military bases lost in northern Shan State but rather on reclaiming what they consider more vulnerable ethnic areas.