Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from April 1
(MoeMaKa), April 2, 2026
Problems Emerging as the Revolution Drags On As the Spring Revolution reaches its fifth year, a range of challenges has begun to surface.
From a positive perspective, the prolonged duration of the revolution can be seen as a sign of perseverance, resilience, and conviction. The fact that revolutionary forces still maintain significant strength, continue to enjoy public support, and have reduced the territorial control of the military regime compared to five years ago all demonstrate that the revolution remains alive.
However, alongside these indicators arises an important question: has the revolution already passed its peak? Some are questioning whether the period of maximum military success and territorial control by revolutionary armed groups has already come and gone.
Others argue that warfare naturally involves ups and downs, and that it is too early to conclude that one side has gained decisive superiority. From a military strategy perspective, it is normal to retreat during intense enemy offensives and regroup to launch counteroffensives when the enemy weakens.
Yet, the loss of strategically and militarily important areas suggests that the situation may go beyond mere tactical maneuvering.
Another question emerges: is the Spring Revolution a long-term revolutionary movement with enduring goals, or primarily a response to the February 1, 2021 military coup aimed at completely removing the junta?
Many leaders and much of the public initially viewed it as a fast-moving uprising. Even after choosing armed resistance, there seemed to be a widespread belief that victory or defeat would be decided within a few years. This belief drove people to commit all available resources. Some supporters even sold personal possessions, including jewelry, to contribute funds for the revolution or to help purchase weapons for local People’s Defense Forces.
There was strong confidence that the revolution would succeed quickly, and people were willing to sacrifice their assets for that outcome.
However, such intense enthusiasm is difficult to sustain over a long period. In the early phase, there were widespread efforts to mobilize the public with expectations that the revolution would succeed within months or a couple of years. Many people believed this. Some even delayed COVID-19 vaccinations until after the revolution’s success or until a civilian government they supported came to power. Others postponed their children’s education with the expectation that schooling would resume after victory.
But after five years, reality has made it clear to many that these expectations were unrealistic.
People are beginning to understand that, given the nature of armed struggle, it is impossible to achieve a decisive victory overnight. This growing awareness of reality can be seen as a positive development. It is important to recognize the situation as it is and prepare both mentally and materially for a long-term struggle.
In prolonged conflicts like this, common challenges begin to emerge:
conflicts of interest among allied groups, weak governance and management, tensions between centralized control and regional autonomy, ethnic nationalism leading to friction and conflict between groups, corruption and misuse of resources, difficulties in resource management, and problems related to military recruitment.
Recently, there have been reports of NUG-affiliated PDF units surrounding areas with makeshift oil wells near the border of Myaing and Pauk townships in Magway Region, pressuring for taxation rights over oil extraction. There have also been clashes involving BNRA forces led by Bo Nagar, who had surrendered to the military, as well as criticisms over how cases of sexual violence and extrajudicial killings in some NUG-controlled areas have been handled. Disagreements among supporters of the Spring Revolution have become more noticeable.
Between November and February, internal complaints by staff against Daw Kyi Pyar, Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office of the NUG, and her husband also sparked divisions among supporters. Criticism of how the NUG handled the issue led even some CDM groups to publicly object.
Additionally, there has been a growing number of cases where members of certain PDF units under the NUG Ministry of Defense have overstayed leave, lost contact with their units, or been declared deserters, with their names and photos publicly released.
On another front, clashes between allied ethnic armed groups—such as the TNLA and MNDAA—have occurred, involving territorial seizures and arrests in recent months. These incidents are seen as reflecting a lack of prior agreements or policy coordination among allied forces regarding territorial control, as well as broader political weaknesses.
As the revolution passes the five-year mark, questions continue to arise:
Has it already moved past its strongest phase, or can revolutionary forces realistically reassess the past five years, learn from experience, correct their weaknesses, and regain momentum?
The prolonged nature of the revolution is both a test of its true strength and a signal that it is evolving into a long-term struggle—one that inevitably brings more complex challenges that cannot be ignored.