Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from April 3
(MoeMaKa), April 4, 2026
From February 1, 2021 to April 3, 2026
Just a few days before the end of last year—on December 28—and again in early January and early February this year, an election was held that lacked both freedom and fairness. As widely expected, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won by a landslide.
Following this result, on April 3, 2026, at the Union Parliament convened in Naypyidaw, one president was elected from among three vice-presidential nominees. The military cast its votes to elect Senior General Min Aung Hlaing—who had not yet removed his uniform—as president.
A few days earlier, a ceremony had been held to transfer the military’s highest responsibility, the position of Commander-in-Chief. Many people assumed that Senior General Min Aung Hlaing had transitioned into a civilian, becoming U Min Aung Hlaing. However, in news reports about the recent National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) meeting, he was still referred to as Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. This indicates that although he transferred responsibilities, he has not relinquished his military rank—in other words, he has not yet removed his uniform, which is quite surprising.
This raises the question: has he not yet assumed the presidency, and therefore not removed his uniform? But since he is already serving as acting president, even the formal transfer of presidential duties would effectively be from himself to himself.
It is not surprising that he won an election that was carefully controlled and managed from all sides to ensure the desired outcome. Nor is there anything new about the storyline: a coup, followed five years later by an election, producing the expected result, and then he himself becoming president.
Looking back over the five-year period from the February 1, 2021 coup to the present presidency, Myanmar has experienced the following:
In the early phase of the coup, dozens were killed during violent crackdowns on protests. Arrests, beatings, destruction, and extrajudicial killings took place in late February and throughout March 2021 in cities across the country—Yangon, Mandalay, Monywa, Pyay, Mawlamyine, Dawei, Myitkyina, and others.
After March 2021, protests shifted to flash demonstrations. Protesters were arrested, tortured, and imprisoned. Some protesters and activists chose armed resistance and abandoned formal political activity. They fled to ethnic armed territories, underwent military training, and began preparing to form armed groups.
Some of these youths and activists later returned to cities within months, carrying out urban guerrilla attacks, bombings, and targeted assassinations of alleged informants.
Young people opposing the coup, who felt that political organizing in cities was no longer possible, were pushed by circumstances and mobilization efforts to seek refuge with ethnic armed organizations. They moved toward armed struggle and urban guerrilla tactics. The February 1, 2021 coup created conditions that strengthened ethnic armed groups both politically and militarily.
Those choosing armed resistance either joined existing ethnic armed groups or trained under them, then formed local defense forces in their own towns and villages under various names.
These developments reignited and intensified a civil war that had already persisted for decades. The goal of completely dismantling military dictatorship through armed struggle further escalated the conflict.
Over more than four years—nearly five—of civil war and urban fighting, tens of thousands of fighters from both sides have been involved, and civilian casualties have reached from the thousands to the tens of thousands. Accurate figures are difficult to obtain, as neither side releases reliable data, and civilian death tolls are also hard to verify. Most figures come from compiled reports by media and social networks.
Beyond human losses, there has been severe destruction of natural resources and environmental damage: deforestation, mining, gold extraction damaging river systems, and destruction of farmland—all significantly worse compared to the period before February 1, 2021.
Human capital has also suffered: loss of access to education, interrupted schooling, forced recruitment into armed groups, collapse of public healthcare programs, loss of vaccination access for newborns, and deaths among the elderly due to lack of medical care—all occurring in large numbers over the past five years.
Even without precise statistics, the scale of human loss, social disruption, and environmental destruction is clearly visible and deeply felt through everyday observation and awareness.
Now, just over five years since the coup, Min Aung Hlaing has secured the presidency through a pre-arranged electoral process designed to appear legitimate. But the question remains: will the civil war, assassinations, extrajudicial killings, unjust punishments, and the country’s decline come to an end?
The answer is no—they will not.
The civil war continues. Airstrikes occur daily. Ground battles persist—offensives, defensive fighting, forced conscription, and the burning and destruction of homes and villages are still ongoing.
Even after obtaining the title of “elected president,” he is unlikely to hesitate in escalating the civil war to maintain power, nor in continuing arrests, torture, and killings.
For anti-dictatorship forces, it is now critically important to clearly understand how the military regime has adapted—changing its appearance, tactics, and methods—and to reassess and develop strategies that match the evolving situation. It is not only about survival, but about developing strategies for victory.