Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from March 2
(MoeMaKa), March 3, 2026
On March 2—when the full moon day of Tabaung, regarded by Buddhists as a sacred day, coincided with Peasants’ Day (marking the 1962 military coup)
On March 2—when the full moon day of Tabaung, regarded by Buddhists as a sacred day, coincided with Peasants’ Day (marking the 1962 military coup)—the junta’s State Administration Council (SAC) announced this morning that, by order of the National Defence and Security Council, 7,337 political prisoners would be granted amnesty. In addition, more than 12,000 individuals charged under Sections 50(j) and 52(a) of the Counter-Terrorism Law, as well as over 9,500 ongoing cases, were dismissed.
Although amnesties have been declared frequently since the coup, they previously applied mainly to Section 505(a) of the Penal Code and certain other charges. This time, for the first time, those imprisoned or facing trial under the Counter-Terrorism Law have been included in the amnesty.
It is assumed that the decision to prominently include those charged under the Counter-Terrorism Law may be aimed at easing both domestic and international political pressure. It may also be intended to weaken armed resistance forces opposing the military following the junta-organized election, and to encourage a shift toward a “middle path” of above-ground political engagement.
According to the March 2 announcement, only Sections 50(j) and 52(a) of the Counter-Terrorism Law were specifically included. This suggests that those directly involved in early post-coup urban guerrilla attacks in Yangon and other cities were deliberately excluded. Instead, the amnesty appears primarily intended for those accused of financially supporting armed or urban guerrilla activities, disseminating related information, or being associated with such attacks.
Among those released are NLD leaders including former Naypyitaw Mayor Dr. Myo Aung, former Brigadier General U Min Thu, and former Yangon Region government member Daw Moe Moe Su Kyi. Dr. Myo Aung and U Min Thu, who were freed from Naypyitaw Prison, were reportedly released under a separate order by the military authorities, as their cases were not directly related to the provisions mentioned in the announcement.
Reports also indicate that some student union members and young protest leaders were included in the March 2 amnesty.
Because the figures in the junta’s amnesty announcements are often viewed with skepticism, political prisoner rights monitoring groups are closely observing whether the stated total of 7,337 detainees charged under the specified provisions has indeed been fully released. Based on March 2 release figures, the Myanmar-wide Political Prisoners Network has so far confirmed 1,895 releases.
The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) has reported that more than 23,000 people have been arrested, detained, or sentenced since the coup. However, questions remain about how accurate such figures can be under current conditions.
The release of thousands of political prisoners just over a month after the military staged and managed an election designed to produce its desired outcome has drawn comparisons by some political analysts to the post-2010 election period, when hundreds and later thousands of political prisoners were released in 2011 and 2012 in an effort to gain international recognition. However, analysts note that although the current move resembles the approach taken in 2011–2012, the results are unlikely to be the same.
At that time, the country was not experiencing widespread armed conflict as it is now. The government led by President U Thein Sein controlled most of the country’s territory, and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest shortly after the election, helping to build a certain degree of international trust.
Although some in the international and domestic political communities were skeptical of the Thein Sein government’s reforms, they nevertheless viewed them somewhat positively. There was no widespread imposition of martial law, nor large swathes of territory beyond government control.
In contrast, in 2026, the junta reportedly does not effectively control or dominate between roughly 40 to 60 percent of the country’s territory. Martial law has been declared in 63 townships across areas affected by armed conflict, and the civil war has been intensifying for nearly five years. In such circumstances, invitations to reconciliation, formal political engagement, or peace talks are unlikely to be persuasive.
While the release of thousands of political prisoners arrested over the past five years is, in any case, welcome news and a rare positive development for Myanmar’s future amid ongoing crises, it is necessary to remain cautious and avoid excessive optimism.