Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from March 21
(MoeMaKa), March 22, 2026
MDY-PDF-controlled areas along the Ayeyarwady River basin in central Myanmar
When people refer to central Myanmar, they are generally talking about Mandalay, the city that lies midway between the country’s northern tip and Yangon, the port city in the south. In the same way, Mandalay also sits roughly between eastern Shan State and the border regions of Rakhine and Chin States in the west. In that sense, it occupies a central geographic position in Myanmar. It lies on the central plain between the mountain ranges and uplands to the east and west of the Ayeyarwady River, which flows north to south through the country.
Mandalay is not only a crossroads for border trade with both India and China, but also a major transit city linking northern, northwestern, and northeastern Myanmar. It is also the country’s second most populous city.
Because it sits at the junction of the main routes connecting those regions, Mandalay is a city of major administrative, economic, and military importance. That is why, during Operation 1027, when resistance forces were able to advance from Nawnghkio to areas near Pyin Oo Lwin, the coup military must have been genuinely concerned about Mandalay. During that period, resistance forces were able to capture Nawnghkio and Madaya, and they also took control of areas as close as Sedawgyi Dam and the Alpha cement factory project site, only a few miles from Mandalay.
As revolutionary armed groups tried to gradually seize territory from the north of Mandalay toward the south, they managed to capture Nawnghkio, but then the fighting near Taung Hkam village stalled for about a year. Had Taung Hkam been captured, the route from northern Shan into the Kyaukse plain would have opened up, creating a situation in which Mandalay could be directly threatened. However, the military situation did not allow Taung Hkam to be taken. The TNLA and the Danu People’s Liberation Army fought there for two full years in both offensive and defensive operations, but in 2025 they eventually had to withdraw northward from Taung Hkam.
Up until late 2024, which could be described as the peak of the success of Operation 1027 that began in late 2023, the resistance forces’ strengths included coordination, access to weapons and ammunition, technological gains, and the ability of allied groups to mount coordinated offensives.
By 2025, however, revolutionary armed forces had gradually begun losing territory after reaching a position from which they could threaten strategic military locations and supply hubs that connect upper Myanmar. The ceasefire between the MNDAA and the junta at the beginning of 2025 allowed the coup military to reduce pressure on some fronts. After that, it was able to retake Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, and Hsipaw, and then reached another ceasefire with the TNLA in October of last year. Because of the agreement to hand back Mogok and Momeik, the MDY-PDF ended up bearing responsibility for holding the north-south belt of territory along the eastern side of the Ayeyarwady River, stretching from central Myanmar up toward the northern edge.
For the MDY-PDF, which had controlled towns such as Madaya, Thabeikkyin, Singu, and Tagaung for a period of time, maintaining those areas brought growing challenges. To continue holding them required sufficient weapons, ammunition, military leadership, and funding. Under these circumstances, internal factionalism emerged within the MDY-PDF, and in late 2025 two of its leaders were reportedly arrested and detained. Some accounts say differences in opinion had already begun during fighting such as the battle at Hphotaw junction, which connects to Mogok, before Mogok was handed back.
When the TNLA entered a ceasefire and returned Mogok and Momeik, the MDY-PDF—which controlled the strategically important eastern bank of the Ayeyarwady in Mandalay Region—was simultaneously dealing with internal disagreements.
The areas controlled by the MDY-PDF are regions with gold mining concessions. They are therefore important not only as sources of financial revenue for revolutionary forces, but also as a communications corridor between northern Shan and Sagaing on the western side of the Ayeyarwady River.
If the goal is to cut off links between Sagaing Region—where local defense forces and NUG-aligned PDF battalions operate—and the resistance forces in the northeast and the north, then areas in Mandalay Region such as Madaya, Thabeikkyin, Singu, and Tagaung become extremely important.
This overall landscape suggests that the coup military likely aims to separate the interconnected revolutionary armed forces in Mandalay Region and Sagaing Region from one another.
At a time when the junta had not yet been able to launch a major offensive in Sagaing, NUG-aligned PDF forces began moving against Bo Naga’s BNRA. That in turn gave the military an opportunity to persuade Bo Naga to surrender. After his surrender, the military appears to have used the information it obtained, along with the weakening of revolutionary armed strength in Pale and Yinmabin, to launch offensives without missing the opportunity—and it continues doing so to this day.
In summary, the areas once controlled by the MDY-PDF are strategic not only because of the revenue they generate from natural resources, but also because of their geographic position. They lie along the Mandalay–Mogok road, a corridor linking north and south. Preventing further loss of these territories is therefore a responsibility shared by all revolutionary armed forces.
For the military junta, the objective appears to be not only to cut the lines of connection among revolutionary armed organizations, but also to gradually retake and reassert control over territory under resistance influence. Politically, it is also trying to force through elections and a parliament, while at the same time seeking to keep civilians in areas and towns not directly affected by war distracted from or detached from revolutionary activity.