Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from March 1
(MoeMaKa), March 2, 2026
From the Military’s Sham Election to a Sham Parliament, and the Situation of Fighting in Northern Shan
Dissatisfied with the results of the 2020 election, the military staged a coup more than five years ago on this day, before dawn on the day when the newly elected parliament was scheduled to convene for the first time. After seizing power, the military arrested and imprisoned leaders of the winning party. NLD party offices across the country were destroyed and burned. As security forces violently suppressed protesters opposing the coup, many young demonstrators chose the path of armed resistance, pushing Myanmar back into a nationwide civil war for the first time in over 70 years.
Unable to accept the election results, the military and its proxy party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), pressured the NLD government to re-examine the voter lists. They made various allegations: that voter lists contained errors, that individuals voted multiple times, that there had been electoral fraud, and even that deceased persons were included on voter rolls. Ultimately, this led to the coup on February 1, the day parliament was supposed to convene.
Although the military said it would review the voter lists afterward, it failed to produce solid evidence proving that fraud had occurred in the 2020 election. Nevertheless, it annulled the election results.
Following the coup, armed resistance attacks, flash protests in towns and cities, and bombings of police and military posts and security checkpoints became increasingly common from mid-2021 onward. The coup regime used these developments as justification to repeatedly delay holding new elections, stretching the timeline until 2024. After losing control of large areas of territory during 2024, the military began to see elections as a possible political exit strategy.
Because many territories fell out of the military’s control during Operation 1027, the areas where elections could realistically be held amounted to less than 50 percent of the country. In some townships, the military only controlled the town center while most surrounding villages were outside its control. Yet those townships were still counted as places where elections had been held.
The election held across late 2025 and early 2026 thus became Myanmar’s second election conducted during a civil war since independence. It can be compared to the election held over a year and a half during 1951–1952, after the outbreak of the civil war in 1949.
A key feature of the 2025/2026 election was that election laws were revised to restrict other parties, ensuring a landslide victory for the USDP. As a result, the 2025/2026 election is likely to be recorded in Myanmar’s history as the least free and fair election ever held under a multi-party system.
At the Union Parliament session convened on March 16, USDP chairman U Khin Yi was elected Speaker of the parliament, while U Maung Maung Ohn, currently serving as Minister of Information, was chosen as Deputy Speaker.
With the USDP and the military dominating roughly 80–90 percent of the seats, the 2026 Union Parliament is far less independent than the parliament formed in 2011. Since the election itself is widely regarded as fraudulent, the parliament formed from its results also lacks public trust.
This parliament is unlikely to reduce the suffering endured by Myanmar’s people amid the civil war. Instead, it appears more likely to reinforce the underlying causes of the conflict, including military dictatorship and ethnic chauvinism.
Some non-military-backed political parties participated in the election hoping that the country might transition back from direct military rule to a system with separation of powers among legislative, executive, and judicial branches. However, due to manipulation and unfair practices by the USDP and the military authorities, these parties were unable to secure significant representation in parliament.
Another major development today concerns the military situation between two ethnic armed alliance groups in northern Shan State.
The MNDAA launched attacks on towns, bases, and checkpoints controlled by the TNLA. About two days after the clashes began, MNDAA forces managed to take full control of Kutkai, and there are indications that they may continue advancing toward Namkham, which borders the Kutkai area.
Reports on March 16 indicated that MNDAA forces were conducting attacks and troop buildups along the Namphatka–Namkham road and the Muse–Namkham road.
After MNDAA took control of Kutkai, traffic on the Lashio–Muse highway between Lashio and the 105-mile trade zone reportedly reopened. This route had been blocked since February 13, when clashes broke out between TNLA and MNDAA forces in Kutkai, after which the Kokang forces had halted goods transportation from Hsenwi. The route was reopened on March 16.
Speculation is also growing that MNDAA might attempt to capture Namkham, a border town on the Shweli River across from China, where Shan, Ta’ang (Palaung), and Kachin communities live. Namkham was captured and administered by the TNLA during Operation 1027.
Namkham is an important border trade town linking Myanmar with China, particularly for trade routes coming from Bhamo and Mansi in Kachin State toward the Chinese border.
Historically, the MNDAA has never attacked or controlled Namkham before, so speculation that it may target the town during the current conflict with the TNLA represents a significant new development.
The ongoing armed conflict between the two northern alliance groups could reshape the military and alliance landscape in northern Shan State. For the military regime, clashes among the northern alliances will almost certainly be viewed as an opportunity that it may try to exploit.