Photo: TNISO
Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from March 17
(MoeMaKa), March 18, 2026
Conspiracy Theories Surrounding Clashes Among Northern Shan Alliance Groups
In recent days, attacks by the Kokang armed group (MNDAA) on towns and positions controlled by the Ta’ang armed group (TNLA) in Kutkai, Namhpatka, and Namkham in northern Shan State have sparked widespread narratives portraying these घटनाएँ as part of China’s strategic maneuvering. The MNDAA has also been depicted as a proxy force acting under China’s direction.
Such interpretations fall under what is commonly referred to in English as “conspiracy theories”—assumptions that are widely suspected but lack concrete, verifiable evidence.
Kutkai is located north of Theinni (Hseni) along the Lashio–Muse border trade route, a key corridor connecting Mandalay—Myanmar’s central commercial hub—with the China border. It lies within what is sometimes referred to as the Kachin Sub-state region and borders the Kokang Self-Administered Zone to the east. Situated on a highland rising from the Theinni plain, Kutkai has a relatively cool climate.
The population is mainly composed of Kachin and Shan ethnic groups, along with Palaung (Ta’ang), Kokang, and Lisu communities. Traveling from Theinni toward Muse, one passes Kutkai before reaching the mountainous and plain areas around Loi Sam Sip.
Kutkai, a strategically important town on the main northern Shan trade route with a cool highland environment, was seized by the TNLA from the military junta during the first phase of Operation 1027. To its northwest lies Namkham Township, which TNLA captured in November 2023, followed by Kutkai in early January 2024. To the east is Laukkai Township in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone. When TNLA captured Kutkai, MNDAA forces also took control of certain parts of the town.
At that time, there were no major disputes among allied groups regarding control and administration of Kutkai.
However, over more than two years of shared control between TNLA and MNDAA, armed clashes occurred at least twice—once earlier and again in February this year. These incidents raise the question: why are frictions and violent confrontations occurring among allied groups?
There have been no clear explanations from responsible officials of the respective armed organizations. While such clashes are often attributed to misunderstandings between lower-ranking troops, the repeated nature of these incidents suggests deeper causes possibly linked to organizational policies.
Clashes have also occurred multiple times between TNLA and KIA forces, leading to leadership-level discussions. Although TNLA–MNDAA clashes have been less frequent than TNLA–KIA incidents, they have escalated to the use of small arms, heavy weapons, and drones.
On February 13 in Kutkai, an incident involving the removal of MNDAA-installed CCTV cameras and physical confrontation with MNDAA personnel reportedly contributed to MNDAA’s subsequent move to seize the town. This has fueled conspiracy theories suggesting possible Chinese involvement behind the scenes.
There have also been reports claiming that China and Myanmar’s military regime want to reopen the Muse–Lashio trade route, and that MNDAA’s actions in Kutkai serve this objective. Additionally, rumors suggest MNDAA instructed KIA forces in Namhpatka to withdraw their security posts to five miles away from the main Union Highway. However, KIA officials stated on March 17 that they had not received such notice.
China’s broader interests—such as stabilizing northeastern Myanmar, securing border trade routes, and protecting infrastructure projects including oil and gas pipelines, as well as planned railway links from Yunnan to Mandalay and Kyaukphyu under the Belt and Road Initiative—have led some to interpret these territorial battles as being orchestrated or influenced by China.
Similar conspiracy theories emerged at the beginning of Operation 1027, claiming China supported the Three Brotherhood Alliance with weapons, funding, and technology to punish the Myanmar military. However, no concrete evidence has substantiated these claims.
Roughly two to three months after Operation 1027 began, a China-mediated ceasefire (the Haigeng Agreement) was reached, but it later collapsed, leading to the second phase of the operation. About a month after the second phase began, China’s foreign minister visited Naypyidaw and met with junta leader Min Aung Hlaing.
Following this meeting, China reportedly pressured ethnic armed groups along its border to cease hostilities, including groups like the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which had previously provided weapons and financial support.
From a strategic perspective, China appears less concerned with whether Myanmar is governed by Min Aung Hlaing’s military and more focused on ensuring stability along its border and avoiding situations where multiple armed groups control areas where it has investments. This suggests China may have conditionally supported the military as a central authority—provided there are elections, ceasefires, and some level of negotiation with ethnic armed groups.
This influence is often referred to as the “Chinese Factor.”
However, attributing intra-alliance conflicts entirely to China—such as claims that China is determining Myanmar’s fate or that MNDAA is merely a Chinese proxy—risks overlooking internal weaknesses. These include deficiencies in relationships, coordination, and the fundamental principles of alliance-building among ethnic armed groups.
Blaming China alone may distract from the need to reassess and strengthen these internal dynamics.
Conspiracy theories are not always accurate or aligned with reality. In some cases, they may even serve to obscure one’s own weaknesses. Recognizing this possibility is important.