Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from March 15
(MoeMaKa), March 16, 2026
Clashes and Interpretations Surrounding Fighting Between Northern Alliance Armed Groups
In recent days, the armed conflict that has broken out between two members of the Northern Brotherhood Alliance—the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)—no longer appears to be a mere accidental skirmish or minor clash at the lower levels. Instead, it has taken on the characteristics of military operations involving attacks on enemy positions and attempts to seize and control territory.
According to statements released by the TNLA and reports from Shwe Phee Myay News, a Ta’ang media outlet, the TNLA claims that it has not issued an order to open fire except in cases of self-defense.
On the morning of March 14, MNDAA forces reportedly initiated attacks. The following day, March 15, MNDAA managed to take control of Kutkai town. Near Nam Phat Kar, on the Lashio–Muse road, MNDAA troops also attacked TNLA positions. By March 15, reports also emerged that MNDAA forces were attacking the 12-mile hill position on the Nam Phat Kar–Namkham road, raising speculation that MNDAA might advance further toward Namkham.
During Operation 1027, MNDAA captured Lashio city and the Northeastern Regional Military Command, while TNLA captured Kutkai, Kyaukme, Nawnghkio, and Hsipaw along the Mandalay–Muse highway. Why, then, are the two forces now fighting each other?
The simple answer is that their respective interests and objectives have come into conflict.
Ethnic armed organizations, which are structured primarily around ethnic identity, often do not share identical political positions or future political goals. In some cases, they may lack clearly articulated political doctrines or consistent ideological foundations. Instead, many of these organizations are built upon ethnic nationalism—prioritizing their own ethnic group above all else—combined with reliance on military strength. This may be a major underlying factor.
When ethnic nationalism merges with militarism, prioritizing the idea that the strongest military force ultimately determines outcomes, conflicts tend to arise in areas where territories overlap—particularly over control of land, natural resources, taxation, and recruitment of new soldiers. As a result, disputes increasingly end up being resolved through armed confrontation.
In political science terms, the current conflict between the two armed forces could be described as “inter-ethnic conflict.”
Such conflicts are likely not limited to northern Shan State. During politically and militarily unstable periods like the present, similar tensions could emerge in other ethnic regions as well—for example:
• Pa-O and Karenni (Kayah) areas
• Rakhine and Chin regions
• Shanni and Kachin areas
• Ta’ang and Kachin areas
Disputes over administration, taxation, recruitment, and the behavior of one ethnic armed group toward other ethnic communities during armed conflict can all generate grievances or tensions.
Inter-ethnic conflicts can be resolved in two fundamentally different ways:
• through peaceful methods, such as open discussion, criticism, fair legal systems, referendums, and political negotiations; or
• through armed confrontation, like the clashes currently occurring between the two armed forces.
The successes of Operation 1027 occurred at a time when the military regime underestimated the revolutionary forces’ ability to unite. By coordinating their efforts, the revolutionary groups were able to open multiple fronts simultaneously and launch large-scale offensives.
However, after revolutionary forces began gaining territorial control throughout late 2023 and throughout 2024, the unity that had enabled those victories began to cool and weaken.
It is not entirely accurate to conclude that all developments since Operation 1027 are solely the result of Chinese pressure or interference.
It is true that China pressured the northern armed groups involved in Operation 1027 to agree to ceasefires, fearing the rapid momentum of the operation, the potential collapse of the coup regime—which functioned as the de facto central government—and the possibility that Myanmar might fragment into territories controlled by different armed groups, leading to further conflicts among them.
China reportedly exerted pressure by:
• closing border gates to block flows of weapons, ammunition, and funds to northern revolutionary groups via the United Wa State Army (UWSA), and
• controlling assets held by these groups inside China.
These actions are widely acknowledged facts.
However, attributing every development since Operation 1027 entirely to Chinese manipulation risks overlooking the need for internal reflection by the armed groups themselves. Such an explanation effectively shifts all responsibility to external actors while avoiding questions such as:
• whether alliances have weakened due to conflicting interests, or
• whether political principles such as democracy and federalism have been drifting further away from the movements’ practices.
While it is reasonable to assume that the enemy will always attempt to weaken alliances and provoke divisions among allies, it should also be remembered that if internal resilience is strong, enemy strategies and tactics will not easily succeed.