Myanmar Spring Chronicle – Scenes from February 10
(MoeMaKa), February 11, 2026
Two Years After the Activation of the Conscription Law
The “People’s Military Service Law,” enacted in 2010 by the former military regime (SPDC), was put into effect on February 10, 2024, after the coup leader signed and announced its activation.
February 2024 came nearly four months after the launch of “Operation 1027,” carried out by the Three Brotherhood Alliance in northern Myanmar. It was also nearly three months after towns and military bases controlled by the coup regime in Karenni (Kayah) State and Rakhine State began coming under attack.
By nearly four months into Operation 1027, the coup military was facing severe manpower shortages. In battles in areas such as Laukkai in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone, many junta troops—including senior officers—surrendered, were captured as prisoners of war, or were killed. As a result, the regime faced an urgent need to replenish large numbers of personnel, leading it to activate the mandatory conscription law.
Although the law was declared in effect on February 10, 2024, and the necessary implementing procedures were not yet fully prepared, conscription began about a month later. The regime announced it would recruit 5,000 conscripts per month nationwide. Men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 are required to serve for two years. Those classified as professionals or skilled workers are eligible up to age 45 for men and 34 for women.
However, since the military effectively controls only about 40 to 60 percent of the country, the monthly target of 5,000 conscripts does not truly come from the entire national population but rather from areas under its control. At the outset, a military spokesperson cited census data claiming there were 13 million eligible youths of conscription age nationwide. In practice, recruitment has taken place only in areas firmly under administrative and security control.
Nearly two years after conscription began, women have not yet been called up, and recruitment has focused mainly on men. In recent weeks, however, reports have emerged that authorities in some regions have started collecting lists of women for potential conscription.
After the law came into force, administrative bodies at ward, township, and district levels—along with police and military personnel—became integral parts of the conscription machinery. At the same time, it has become widely known nationwide that individuals involved in this system have been accepting bribes from those selected by lottery, arrested on the streets, or otherwise targeted, in exchange for exemption from service.
In the early period, replacing a conscript required paying authorities—administrators, police, and military—around 4 to 6 million kyats. Now, the cost has risen to tens of millions of kyats. In addition to recruitment through ward and village registration lists, authorities have conducted nighttime street arrests, detained travelers between towns, forcibly conscripted returnees deported from the Thai border, and used various other methods to fill quotas. As a result, large numbers of young people have fled the country through different means.
Hundreds of thousands of youths have left for countries such as Thailand and Malaysia to avoid conscription. In towns and villages under military control, the youth population has steadily declined, leaving mainly those who lack the means or circumstances to escape.
When the law was first enacted, some advised that if forcibly conscripted, individuals should defect with their weapons to resistance forces or turn their guns on commanding officers at the front lines. Beyond such suggestions, however, resistance groups had few broader strategic or tactical responses to the conscription law.
In the early stages, some impoverished young men from lower-income backgrounds accepted substitute payments—often tens of millions of kyats given to their families—and joined the military. But after nearly two years, the number of people willing to serve as paid substitutes has significantly declined.
Local administrators at ward, township, and village levels, working together with police and military personnel, have reportedly arrested more people than required, releasing them only after extracting substantial sums of money.
These are the realities currently faced by young people and their families inside the country.
For the coup military, however, nearly two years of conscription have yielded around 100,000 new recruits—equivalent to roughly one-quarter to one-third of its preexisting troop strength—allowing it to replenish and even exceed the losses suffered during Operation 1027.
Although the conscription law has deepened public resentment toward the military among people who oppose the coup, there has been no effective strategy to counter it in practice. Those with financial resources may be able to temporarily leave the country to avoid service. But for those without money, or those unable to leave due to family circumstances, there is little choice but to face whatever comes.